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ABSOLUTE PRIORITY REDUX: FIRST-DAY 
ORDERS AND PRE-PLAN SETTLEMENTS IN 
CHAPTER 11 POST-JEVIC 
BRUCE GROHSGAL? 
ABSTRACT 
This Article considers the problem of priority-skipping dis-
tributions made by a chapter 11 debtor outside of a plan, following 
the Supreme Court’s Jevic decision.1 The Jevic Court extended the 
absolute priority rule—which under U.S. bankruptcy enactments 
dictates the order of distributions to creditors under a chapter 11 
cramdown plan and in a chapter 7 liquidation—to a chapter 11 
case-ending settlement known as a “structured dismissal.” 
The Jevic Court limited its holding to a case-ending set-
tlement. It did not extend the absolute priority rule to an interim or 
pre-plan settlement or other transaction that is not case-ending or 
to a “first-day” distribution made at the very beginning of a chap-
ter 11 case.2 The Court expressed no view about the legality of struc-
tured dismissals in general and did not define when a settlement 
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other than a “structured dismissal” is case-ending. It emphasized, 
without much in the way of details, that the Code’s priority sys-
tem was a “basic underpinning of business bankruptcy law” that 
must be safeguarded even with respect to a pre-plan transaction.3 
This Article considers these issues of pre-plan or “interim” 
settlements and first-day distributions left open by Jevic. It asserts 
that Jevic is best characterized as a transaction among insiders 
and parties asserted to have colluded with them, that assertedly 
provided for a distribution of estate assets to the settling parties 
based on their control and collusion, supported by a hypothetical 
rather than a market valuation of ultimate distributional outcomes. 
This issue—the use of control and collusion supported by a hypo-
thetical valuation to obtain an unfair distribution or “control 
premium”—is the precise issue that gave rise to the absolute pri-
ority rule 150 years ago and that concerned the Court in 203 N. 
LaSalle, the last case before Jevic in which the Court extensively 
considered the absolute priority rule in chapter 11.4 First-day 
relief in chapter 11 presents a similar though not identical valua-
tion dilemma: can a hypothetical prediction made early in the case 
of ultimate distributions to creditors reliably determine that some 
prepetition claims should be paid at the first-day hearing be-
cause such payments ultimately will benefit (or at least will not 
harm) the remaining creditors who are not favored? 
This Article proposes that a proper solicitude is shown for 
the absolute priority rule when an interim or pre-plan settlement 
or other transaction with an insider, secured lender or other party 
who exercises some control over the debtor is subjected to higher 
bids in a market sale process such as an auction. This approach can 
provide a market valuation of the transaction and proposed dis-
tributions that can enable a bankruptcy court to determine whether 
the transaction includes a premium based on control that is pro-
posed to be paid at the expense of other creditors, thus addressing the 
precise mischief sought to be remedied by the absolute priority rule. 
The Jevic Court also left open the rule for bankruptcy court 
approval of first-day distributions that violate the absolute priority 
                                                                                                            
3 Id. at 983–84, 986. 
4 Bank of Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 
434 (1999). 
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rule.5 This Article further contends that a market test for a “first-
day” distribution to an employee, a critical vendor, or other credi-
tor that is challenged as priority-skipping will be limited to 
whether the debtor sought and failed to obtain in the market the 
same good, service, or credit from an alternative supplier on the 
same or better terms than those proposed to be given by the first-
day motion. A bankruptcy court in most cases will not be able to 
obtain, at the time of a first-day hearing, a market determination 
of what will be distributed to creditors months or years later when 
the case ends. And any hypothetical valuation that the court makes 
at a first-day hearing of the ultimate distributions to creditors in 
the case will be highly unreliable. Because of these obstacles, the 
question of whether a first-day payment ultimately will comport 
with distributional priorities should be replaced with the question 
of whether the debtor sought and failed to obtain an alternative 
supply in the market, and by a rebuttable presumption that pre-
serving the going concern value of the chapter 11 debtor is likely, 
ultimately, to benefit even the disfavored creditors. This approach—
which essentially adopts the occasionally maligned “doctrine of 
necessity” and rejects the Seventh Circuit’s Kmart rule—recognizes 
the disturbing weakness of a hypothetical determination made at 
the first day hearing of the ultimate distributions at the end of a 
chapter 11 case. 
I conclude that a bankruptcy court demonstrates a proper 
solicitude for the absolute priority rule under both Jevic and 203 
N. LaSalle when it relies on market exposure of pre-plan settle-
ments and transactions to preclude control premiums to insiders 
or others who have some control over the debtor, and when it bases 
approval of first-day relief on a presumption of going concern value, 
rather than on speculative, hypothetical predictions of ultimate 
distributions to creditors at the end of the case. I suggest that 
these approaches to the approval of these types of interim and 
pre-plan transactions also can provide the certainty sought by the 
Court in Jevic. 
                                                                                                            
5 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 985 (the Court nonetheless voiced strong sup-
port for such payments on the ground that they “enable a successful reorganiza-
tion and make even the disfavored creditors better off” (quoting In re Kmart 
Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 872 (7th Cir. 2004))). 
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INTRODUCTION 
STRUCTURED DISMISSALS, THE ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE, AND THE 
PROBLEM IN JEVIC 
 
The settlement and dismissal that the bankruptcy court ap-
proved in Jevic was a “structured dismissal.”6 The secured credi-
tors, the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors on behalf of 
most of the debtor’s unsecured creditors, and the shareholders en-
tered into a settlement whereby the debtor released a fraudulent 
transfer claim against the secured creditors in exchange for their 
paying $3.7 million to the bankruptcy estate for distribution to 
Jevic’s creditors.7 The settlement further provided that the Court 
would dismiss the chapter 11 case immediately thereafter.8 
A structured dismissal is a settlement of certain claims as-
serted by or against the debtor, that provides for proposed distri-
butions on account of those claims, and that the bankruptcy court 
approves contemporaneously with its entering its order dismiss-
ing the case.9 The debtor in a structured dismissal does not seek 
to end the case by confirming a chapter 11 plan after a vote by 
impaired classes of creditors, or by converting the case to chapter 7 
for liquidation by the chapter 7 trustee.10 Instead, in a structured 
                                                                                                            
6 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 349, 1112(b)(1) (2012). The term “structured dismissal” 
does not appear in the Code (though neither does the term “absolute priority” 
or “absolute priority rule”). The legal grounds for a structured dismissal are 
constructed from several provisions of the Code and Rules. Section 349 authorizes 
the bankruptcy court to dismiss a bankruptcy case, and on the dismissal, any 
property remaining in the bankruptcy estate revests “in the entity in which 
such property was vested immediately before the commencement of the case” 
(which may be the debtor), subject to such conditions as the court, “for cause,” 
may order otherwise. § 349(b). The court’s authority to approve the settlement, 
and order the distribution of property pursuant to it, is generally located in 
§ 363(b), which provides that a chapter 11 debtor, with court approval, may 
use, sell, or lease estate property out of the ordinary course of business, and in 
Rule 9019, which provides that the bankruptcy court “may approve a com-
promise or settlement.” FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019. 
7 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 981. 
8 Id. 
9 American Bankruptcy Institute Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 
11, 2012–2014 Final Report and Recommendations, 23 AM. BANKR. INST. L. 
REV. 1, 293 (2015) [hereinafter ABI Report]. 
10 Id. 
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dismissal, the case ends with the court’s approval of the settle-
ment terms followed by entry of the dismissal order.11 
The problem with the structured dismissal in Jevic was 
that the distribution of the settlement proceeds—which the secured 
lenders would pay to the estate for the release by the debtor of its 
claims against them—would skip over a group of priority unse-
cured creditors, truck-drivers formerly employed by the debtor 
who were terminated contemporaneously with the filing of the 
bankruptcy case.12 The drivers had brought their own suit against 
the debtor and its owner, Sun Capital Partners, for wage claims 
under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) 
Act based on the termination of their employment without hav-
ing been given the sixty days advance notice required by the 
WARN Act.13 The drivers’ wage claims were not part of the set-
tlement.14 Wage claims are unsecured priority claims under the 
Bankruptcy Code.15 The structured dismissal thus arguably vio-
lated the absolute priority rule because the rule required payment 
to the drivers prior to the payment made to the lower priority 
general unsecured creditors who were being paid part of the set-
tlement proceeds under the structured dismissal.16 
The question in Jevic was whether the absolute priority 
rule—which applies under the Bankruptcy Code for confirmation 
of a chapter 11 cramdown plan and to distributions in a chapter 
7 liquidation—also applies to a similarly case-ending structured 
dismissal.17 The Bankruptcy Code says nothing of a structured 
                                                                                                            
11 Id. at 294. 
12 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 976, 980–81. 
13 Id. at 980. The federal WARN Act is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2109. 
Many states have enacted state WARN statutes that are similar to the federal 
WARN Act. The WARN claimants in Jevic brought their action under both 
the federal and state WARN statutes. 
14 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 976, 980. 
15 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4) (2012). 
16 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 980–82. 
17 Id. at 978. A cramdown plan in chapter 11 is a plan that at least one im-
paired class of creditors has voted to reject. Such a plan must comply with the 
absolute priority rule. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2012). Chapter 7, in contrast to chapter 
11, does not allow for the reorganization of a debtor, but instead provides for 
the liquidation of the debtor’s assets and the distribution of the proceeds to 
creditors. The absolute priority rule also applies to final distributions in a chapter 
7 case. 11 U.S.C. § 726 (2012). 
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dismissal and does not expressly provide that the absolute prior-
ity rule extends to any dismissal of a chapter 11 case, structured 
or otherwise.18 
The bankruptcy court in Jevic held that the absolute pri-
ority rule did not apply and approved the structured dismissal.19 
The district court and the Third Circuit agreed with the bankruptcy 
court’s interpretation of the Code and affirmed.20 
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that a bank-
ruptcy court cannot order a non-consensual priority-skipping 
distribution “in connection with a Chapter 11 dismissal.”21 
The Court—quoting its last major decision on the absolute 
priority rule, 203 N. LaSalle in 1999—emphasized that the rule 
developed to address a “concern with the ability of a few insiders, 
whether representatives of management or major creditors, to use 
the reorganization process to gain an unfair advantage,”22 and to 
reduce the risks of “collusion” by which those parties can gain that 
advantage and greater value from the estate for themselves by 
squeezing out other creditors.23 
The Court also expressed its skepticism of the Jevic bank-
ruptcy court’s hypothetical valuations of the claim and the pro-
posed settlement—and of such hypothetical valuations generally.24 
In its view, the bankruptcy court’s finding that the settlement 
was the only way that any unsecured creditor would receive any-
thing had only “equivocal support” in the record, leading the 
Court to “readily imagine other cases that turn on comparably 
dubious predictions.”25 
The Court expressly declined, though, to extend the absolute 
priority rule to pre-plan or “interim” settlements or to “first-day” 
distributions in chapter 11.26 Regarding pre-plan or “interim” set-
tlements, the Court stressed the difficulty of applying the absolute 
                                                                                                            
18 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 984. 
19 Id. at 982. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 978. 
22 Id. at 987 (quoting Bank of Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle 
St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 444 (1999)) (internal quotations omitted). 
23 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 987. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 983–85. 
2018] ABSOLUTE PRIORITY REDUX 69 
priority rule because the nature and extent of the chapter 11 
estate have not yet been fully resolved.27 The Court also stated 
that “one can generally find significant Code-related objectives” 
for priority-skipping “first-day” relief.28 It suggested nonetheless 
that a bankruptcy court must demonstrate a “proper solicitude” for 
the absolute priority rule in substantial, pre-plan transactions.29 
But it offered little additional guidance.30 
This Article proposes that for pre-plan or “interim” settle-
ments and distributions in chapter 11 that appear to circumvent 
the Code’s safeguards of distributional priority, a proper solicitude 
for the absolute priority rule is best achieved by market exposure. 
This approach, when applied to a transaction with an insider or 
other person who exerts control over the debtor, can be used to 
achieve the remedial purposes of the absolute priority rule, which 
are to preclude misallocations of estate value to those who exercise 
control or who collude with them.31  
A corollary of this rule involves recognizing that, to the ex-
tent that market exposure is unavailable, hypothetical valuations 
are of little probative use in determining the propriety of a pre-
plan distribution. This is especially true with respect to first-day 
relief, pursuant to which a bankruptcy court may approve priority-
skipping payments to some creditors because their continuing to 
supply the debtor is considered essential to the debtor’s survival.32 
The question of whether the non-essential creditors who do not 
receive these payments are helped or disadvantaged by this di-
lution of the estate involves hypothetical valuations that are so 
unreliable that a different, specialized rule should apply. I suggest 
a rule that presumes the benefit of preserving the going concern 
                                                                                                            
27 Id. at 985 (citing Motorola, Inc. v. Official Comm. of Unsec’d Creditors 
(In re Iridium Operating LLC), 478 F.3d 452, 464 (2d Cir. 2007)). 
28 Id. 
29 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 986 (quoting Ind. St. Police Pens. Tr. v. Chrysler, 
LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir. 2009)). 
30 Id. at 986–87. 
31 See discussion infra Part II. 
32 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 985 (recognizing that priority-skipping first-day 
payments enable a successful reorganization); see also In re Just for Feet, 
Inc., 242 B.R. 821, 824–25 (D.Del. 1999) (court may “authorize the payment 
of pre-petition claims when such payment is deemed necessary to the survival 
of a debtor in a chapter 11 reorganization”).  
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value of a business and requires strict market exposure to deter-
mine whether an alternative supplier is available on the same or 
better terms than those proposed by the assertedly essential 
supplier who is insisting on the first-day payment.33 
Part I of this Article considers the Jevic Court’s view of the 
remedial purposes of the absolute priority rule, its skepticism of 
hypothetical valuations used in support of chapter 11 distribu-
tions, and it declining—in large part because of that skepticism—to 
extend the absolute priority rule to interim settlements and 
first-day distributions. 
Part II examines the temporal and substantive factors that 
the Jevic Court used to distinguish a case-ending settlement—to 
which the absolute priority rule applies—from an interim set-
tlement, the rule for approval of which the Court left open. Part 
II then proposes a market rather than a hypothetical valuation 
of a challenged interim settlement or other transaction with an 
insider or other person exercising control of the debtor, to achieve 
the remedial purposes of the absolute priority rule, i.e., to preclude 
the payment of a control premium to those who are asserted to be 
exercising control over the debtor and those alleged to have col-
luded with them in achieving the settlement. This approach has 
the additional benefit of advancing other purposes of bankruptcy 
law emphasized by the Jevic Court, especially maximizing dis-
tributions to creditors and providing certainty of outcomes.34 
An example of this approach involves a debtor that proposes 
to settle the estate’s claim against an insider, by releasing the 
insider in exchange for a settlement payment to the estate. The 
question of whether the insider is receiving a control premium—
in the form of having to pay a lower settlement price than what 
the claim is worth (thus also reducing eventual distributions to 
other creditors)—is clearly at issue.35 The debtor’s claim against 
the insider, though, can be marketed for outright sale to an arm’s-
length third-party buyer or to an investor who will fund the costs 
of the litigation in return for a percentage of any recovery on the 
                                                                                                            
33 See discussion infra Part III. 
34 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 985–86 (citing Toibb v. Radloff, 111 S. Ct. 2197 
(1991)). 
35 Marc J. Carmel, If Jevic Is Your Problem, Litigation Finance Might Be 
Your Solution, 36 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1, 2–3 (2017). 
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claim.36 A higher and better bid for the claim from a third-party 
buyer or investor removes the issue of whether a control premium 
is being paid to the insider—the costs and benefits of the transac-
tion are now with the third party.37 If, on the other hand, the 
settlement was vigorously marketed and no higher bid was ob-
tained or the insider made the highest bid at the auction, a strong 
case can be made that the insider’s bid reflects the highest and 
best market price for the claim.38 The insider did not receive a 
control premium in the form of a discount because if the claim was 
worth more, a third party would have bid more.39 
Part III considers the problem posed by hypothetical valua-
tions, also stressed by the Jevic Court, with respect to first-day 
relief and distributions. Part III suggests that a different rule 
should apply for approval of distributions proposed to be made 
pursuant to first-day orders, that are challenged as priority-
skipping. I contend that any determination of whether such pay-
ments ultimately will benefit the other, disadvantaged, creditors 
is so highly speculative as to be meaningless or nearly so in most 
instances. Market exposure for first-day relief—though essential 
to the bankruptcy court’s decision—will be limited to whether an 
alternative can be obtained on better terms. A first-day distribu-
tion challenged as priority-skipping should be approved if the 
debtor proves that it has sought in the market and failed to ob-
tain an alternative to the good, service or credit proposed to be 
supplied by the critical vendor, and that making the critical vendor 
payment is necessary to preserve the debtor’s operations for the 
sale of the business or a restructuring. The question of ultimate 
benefit to other creditors should be presumed, rather than hypo-
thetically determined. As the Jevic Court noted, preserving the 
debtor’s business as a going concern is a Code-related objective in a 
chapter 11 bankruptcy case, and is highly likely to benefit a debtor’s 
employees, suppliers and even the creditors who are not paid on 
the first day.40 A hypothetical valuation of ultimate distributions 
                                                                                                            
36 Id. at 2–4. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 4. 
39 Id. 
40 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 985–86. 
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to the creditors not paid on the first day is in most cases so unre-
liable that it adds little or nothing to the analysis.41 
An example of this approach with respect to a first-day 
motion follows. A vendor supplies the debtor with component parts 
necessary for the debtor’s manufacturing operations, which the 
debtor orders from the vendor by purchase order, on credit and 
an as-needed basis. On the petition date, the debtor owes the vendor 
on unpaid prepetition invoices. The vendor, who in this example 
is under no obligation to continue to supply the component parts 
to the debtor, refuses to do so unless the bankruptcy court ap-
proves the debtor’s paying the vendor 100 percent of its prepeti-
tion claim. The evidence at the first-day hearing is that the 
debtor sought, and was unable to obtain, an immediate alterna-
tive supply of the component parts, and that without the parts 
the debtor will need to shut down its operations. The market expo-
sure in this example is limited to whether the debtor could obtain 
an alternative supplier. But it is reasonable to presume that pre-
serving the debtor’s operating business for sale or restructuring 
will maximize the value of the debtor’s estate and benefit credi-
tors more than shutting down operations and liquidating the 
debtor’s assets piecemeal.42 This presumption, I suggest, is more 
reliable than a hypothetical determination made at the first-day 
hearing of the ultimate distributions that will be paid to credi-
tors at the end of the case. Indeed, Congress enacted the reor-
ganization provisions of U.S. bankruptcy law including chapter 
11 based on this presumption.43 
                                                                                                            
41 Id. This approach, more extensively discussed in Part III, essentially adopts 
the “doctrine of necessity,” by emphasizing the debtor’s proving that it has 
sought in the market and failed to obtain an alternative to the good, service, or 
credit proposed to be supplied by the critical vendor. It rejects the Seventh 
Circuit’s Kmart rule, because the hypothetical predictions that the latter rule 
requires to be made in the first days of a chapter 11 case, of the ultimate distribu-
tions that will be made to different creditors on account of their claims at the 
end of the case, are so speculative as to be meaningless in most cases. 
42 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 220 (1977). 
43 The reorganization provisions of chapters X, XI and XII of the Chandler 
Act enacted in 1938 “embodie[d] the new social economic concept of reorgani-
zation and the rehabilitation of the debtor and his business as a going concern, 
instead of the liquidation, distribution, and stoppage of business with the con-
sequent loss to the debtor, creditors, employees, and the public generally.” 
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I submit in conclusion that both interim settlements and 
transactions with those who exercise control over a debtor, and 
first-day distributions in chapter 11, should be approved on market 
valuations and market-based evidence to the greatest extent 
practicable, rather than hypothetical valuations. This approach, 
I suggest, can in many cases address the issue of the misalloca-
tion of estate value based on control that gave rise to the absolute 
priority rule and that concerned the Court when it considered 
the structured dismissal in Jevic and the plan in 203 N. LaSalle. 
This approach, as discussed in Part IV, also provides the 
certainty sought by the Court in this area of bankruptcy law, in 
a manner that encourages negotiation and settlement without 
altering the parties’ rights under the Code. 
I. THE JEVIC DECISION AND THE REACH OF THE ABSOLUTE 
PRIORITY RULE UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 
A.  The Structured Dismissal in Jevic 
The structured dismissal in Jevic was obtained following 
negotiations over the two remaining major unresolved claims in 
the case. The first—an action commenced on a derivative basis 
by the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors against the 
secured lenders, Sun Capital and CIT Group, seeking to avoid 
alleged fraudulent transfers made in connection with Sun Capi-
tal’s prepetition leveraged buyout (LBO) of Jevic—was settled, 
and the defendants were released, pursuant to the structured 
dismissal. The second—a class action commenced by Jevic’s for-
mer truck-drivers against the debtor and Sun Capital for viola-
tion of state and federal WARN Acts, for Jevic’s alleged failure 
                                                                                                            
Herman M. Knoeller, Reorganization Procedure Under the New Chandler Act, 
24 MARQ. L. REV. 12, 14 (1939). Congress made the same presumption when it 
passed the Bankruptcy Code in 1978. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 220 (1977) 
(“The purpose of a business reorganization case, unlike a liquidation case, is to 
restructure a business’s finances so that it may continue to operate, provide its 
employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a return for its stockhold-
ers. The premise of a business reorganization is that assets that are used for 
production in the industry for which they were designed are more valuable 
than those same assets sold for scrap .... It is more economically efficient to 
reorganize than to liquidate, because it preserves jobs and assets.”). 
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to provide proper notice of its closing and the termination of their 
employment—was not settled.44 
Negotiations originally included all these parties—the 
debtor, the secured lenders, the Committee, the drivers, and the 
holder of the equity in the debt.45 The debtor, the secured lend-
ers, the Committee, and the debtor’s equity holders reached a 
settlement.46 Under the settlement agreement: (1) the bankruptcy 
court would dismiss, with prejudice, the estate’s fraudulent transfer 
claim that the Committee had commenced against Sun Capital and 
CIT; (2) CIT would pay $2.0 million to the estate, for payment of 
administrative expenses including the Committee’s legal fees; (3) 
Sun Capital would transfer to the estate its interest in the re-
maining $1.7 million of the proceeds from the liquidation of its 
collateral; and (4) the court would dismiss Jevic’s chapter 11 case.47 
The drivers, though, were not parties to the settlement.48 
The reason was that the drivers and Sun Capital (which was both 
a secured creditor and owned the equity interests in the debtor) 
could not reach an agreement that provided for the dismissal of 
the drivers’ WARN claims against Sun Capital. Without the driv-
ers’ release, Sun Capital would not agree to a distribution to the 
drivers of any of the $1.7 million that Sun Capital was contrib-
uting to the settlement because it did not want to help finance 
litigation against itself.49 
The bankruptcy court found that a chapter 11 plan could 
not be confirmed in the case, and if the case was converted to 
chapter 7, the chapter 7 trustee would have no funds with which 
                                                                                                            
44 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 976. The Committee alleged that Sun Capital 
and CIT had “hastened Jevic’s bankruptcy by saddling it with debts that it 
couldn’t service.” 
45 In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 177. 
46 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 981. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. The drivers, because they were not part of the settlement, retained 
their claims against both the debtor and Sun Capital. Because the LBO claim 
was the debtor’s only remaining asset, the settlement of that claim and the 
distribution of the settlement proceeds to parties other than the drivers effec-
tively deprived the drivers of any recovery on their WARN claim against the 
debtor. The structured dismissal, though, did not affect the drivers’ WARN 
claim against Sun Capital, which the drivers could continue to prosecute. 
49 Id. 
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to litigate the estate’s LBO claims against Sun Capital and CIT.50 
Considering these “dire circumstances” facing the estate and its 
creditors, the bankruptcy court approved the settlement. “[T]he 
court predicted that without the settlement and dismissal, there 
was ‘no realistic prospect’ of a meaningful distribution for any-
one other than the secured creditors.”51 
B.  The Problem with the Structured Dismissal in Jevic 
The problem with the structured dismissal in Jevic was that 
the distribution of the $3.7 million of settlement proceeds paid 
by the secured lenders to the estate for the release by the debtor 
of its claims against them skipped over a group of priority unse-
cured creditors—the drivers who had brought claims against the 
debtor under the WARN Act.52 The structured dismissal thus 
arguably violated the absolute priority rule because the rule, if it 
applied to a structured dismissal, required payment to the driv-
ers prior to the payment made to the junior, non-priority general 
unsecured creditors.53 
Under the absolute priority rule, a senior creditor who has 
distributional priority under the Code must be paid in full on 
account of its claim, prior to any payment to a junior creditor or 
equity.54 The rule, where it applies, requires the distribution of 
estate assets to the following four tranches of debt and equity, in 
descending order of seniority: (1) first, to each secured creditor, 
up to the lesser of the amount of its claim or the value of its col-
lateral;55 (2) next, to priority unsecured claims (which are listed 
in section 507(a) of the Bankruptcy Code), in descending order of 
priority; (3) then, to general, non-priority unsecured claims; and 
(4) finally, to the holders of equity interests, such as shares or 
membership interests, in the company.56 Under this rule, the 
                                                                                                            
50 Id. at 981–82. 
51 Id. at 982 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 57a, 58a). 
52 Id. at 981. 
53 Id. at 980–82. 
54 ABI Report, supra note 9, at 229–30. 
55 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2012) (providing that if the secured creditor’s claim 
against the debtor exceeds the value of the secured creditor’s collateral, then 
the amount by which the claim exceeds the collateral value is an unsecured 
claim; such a creditor is commonly called “undersecured”). 
56 ABI Report, supra note 9, at 229–30. 
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creditors in the tranche at which the estate’s funds available for 
distribution run out are paid pro rata, and all remaining credi-
tors and equity holders who are junior in distributional priority 
to that tranche receive nothing.57 
If the absolute priority rule applied to the settlement, 
then the drivers were entitled to payment on their priority unse-
cured WARN claims prior to any distribution to the non-priority 
general unsecured claims proposed to be paid under the terms of 
the settlement.58 But Sun Capital and the drivers could not reach 
agreement on the payment to be made to the drivers in exchange 
for their release, and Sun Capital was unwilling to fund litigation 
against itself.59 So, the settlement required distributions to skip 
over the WARN claims.60 The bankruptcy court approved the 
priority-skipping distributions, reasoning that the absolute pri-
ority rule did not apply—because nothing in the Bankruptcy Code 
expressly required application of the rule to a pre-plan settlement—
and the settlement maximized distributions to unsecured credi-
tors.61 If it was not approved “there was ‘no realistic prospect’ of a 
meaningful distribution for anyone other than the secured credi-
tors.”62 The district court, and then the Third Circuit, affirmed.63 
C. The Supreme Court’s Opinion in Jevic 
The question before the Court in Jevic was whether a bank-
ruptcy court has the legal power to order a “priority-skipping 
kind of distribution scheme in connection with a chapter 11 dis-
missal.”64 The Court held that the bankruptcy court does not have 
such power.65 Rather, a “distribution scheme ordered in connec-
tion with the dismissal of a chapter 11 case cannot, without the 
                                                                                                            
57 Id. at 230. 
58 Id. at 229–30. 
59 Id. 
60 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 981. 
61 Id. at 981–82. 
62 Id. at 982 (quoting App. to Pet. For Cert. 58a). 
63 Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.), 2014 WL 
268613 (D. Del. 2014), aff’d, Official Comm. of Unsec’d Creditors ex rel. Jevic 
Holding Corp. v. CIT Grp./Bus. Credit Inc. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.), 787 
F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2015). 
64 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 978 (emphasis in original). 
65 Id. 
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consent of the affected parties, deviate from the basic priority 
rules that apply under the primary mechanisms the Code estab-
lishes for final distributions of estate value in business bank-
ruptcies.”66 That “primary mechanism,” in the Court’s view, is the 
“absolute priority rule.”67 
The Jevic Court, in disapproving the structured dismissal, 
raised again the specters—which have haunted U.S. insolvency 
proceedings since the railroad reorganizations of the late nine-
teenth century—of collusion among controlling secured creditors 
and insiders such as managers and/or shareholders that misal-
locate estate value to those in on the deal on the basis of hypo-
thetical valuations or contrived “sales” of estate assets.68 The 
most common situation sought to be remedied by the absolute 
priority rule was one in which the secured creditors, who were 
senior because they were entitled to the value of their collateral, 
entered into a reorganization plan with the railroad’s managers 
and shareholders, who were not creditors at all and had the most 
deeply subordinated stake in the railroad.69 Under that plan, 
those parties—each of whom exercised a degree of control over the 
enterprise—received all or most of the value of the reorganized 
                                                                                                            
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 983, 984. 
68 See, e.g., Louisville Tr. Co. v. Louisville, New Albany & Chi. Ry. Co., 174 
U.S. 674, 684 (1899) (In which the Supreme Court asked whether the mort-
gagor railroad and its mortgagee could enter into an agreement “by which[,] 
through the form of equitable proceedings[,] all the right [of an] unsecured 
creditor may be wiped out, and the interest of both mortgagor and mortgagee 
in the property preserved and continued? The question carries its own answer. 
Nothing of the kind can be tolerated.”). See also Kan. City Terminal Ry. Co. v. 
Cent. Union Tr. Co. of N.Y., 271 U.S. 445, 455 (1926) (“Unsecured creditors of 
insolvent corporations are entitled to the benefit of the values which remain 
after lienholders are satisfied, whether this is present or prospective, for divi-
dends or only for purposes of control.”); R.R. Co. v. Howard, 74 U.S. 392, 410 
(1868). The early twentieth century case of N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 
482 (1913), provides an example of the kind of contrived “sale” that concerned 
the critics of the equity receiverships by which railroads were reorganized. The 
railroad’s assets in Boyd were purchased on a going concern basis for $61 million 
at a sale “where there was no competition,” even though the enterprise value 
of the railroad was stated at $345 million in the reorganization agreement, 
and the purchaser, a mere month after its purchase, issued $190 million of 
new bonds and $155 million of stock on the property. Id. at 492, 508. 
69 See Boyd, 228 U.S. at 492, 508; Knoeller, supra note 43, at 15–16. 
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railroad, and the unsecured creditors in the middle, who were 
powerless by comparison, received little or nothing.70 Such a 
transaction entered into between senior stakeholders and insid-
ers often resulted in a distribution to those in control that was 
attributable to that control, and that deprived the creditors who 
were in the middle and not in on the deal of their due.71 
The rule at present extends to all tranches of debt and 
equity.72 But the remedial purposes of the rule remain same. 
The Jevic Court, quoting its last major decision on the rule, 203 
N. LaSalle in 1999, emphasized that “the absolute priority rule 
was developed in response to the ‘concern with the ability of a 
few insiders, whether representatives of management or major 
creditors, to use the reorganization process to gain an unfair ad-
vantage.’”73 The Court in 203 N. LaSalle was considering a 
somewhat different aspect of the same problem—the “new value 
corollary” or exception to the absolute priority rule.74 Under that 
exception to the rule, a cramdown chapter 11 plan can be con-
firmed—even if a senior creditor objects because it is not being 
paid in full—if the property distributed to the junior creditors or 
equity holders under the plan is on account of their contribution 
of “new capital in money or money’s worth, reasonably equiva-
lent to the property’s value, and necessary for successful reor-
ganization of the restructured enterprise.”75 
                                                                                                            
70 Id. 
71 11 U.S.C. §§ 726, 1129(b) (2012); Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 987 (explaining 
that the absolute priority rule addresses “risks of collusion, i.e., senior secured 
creditors and general unsecured creditors teaming up to squeeze out priority 
unsecured creditors.”); ABI Report, supra note 9, at 229–30. 
72 11 U.S.C. §§ 726, 1129(b) (2012). 
73 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 987 (quoting Bank of Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n 
v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 444 (1999)). 
74 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 435. 
75 Id. at 442. Justice Douglas in 1939, in Case v. L.A. Lumber Products Co., 
embedded the absolute priority rule into the corporate reorganization plan 
confirmation provisions of the Bankruptcy Act that preceded the Code, when 
he interpreted the textual requirement that a confirmable plan be “fair and 
equitable” to require compliance with a rule of “full or absolute priority.” Case v. 
L.A. Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 114, 117 (1939). Douglas enunciated 
the new value exception to the rule in the same case. Under the reorganiza-
tion plan in L.A. Lumber, as in 203 N. LaSalle, the owners of the debtor were 
receiving a control premium consisting of some of the shares in the new, reor-
ganized debtor—for free—even though the creditors in the case were not being 
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The owners of the debtor in 203 N. LaSalle had proposed 
and obtained confirmation of a plan under which they—whose 
interests were junior to those of creditors—would receive all of 
the equity in the reorganized debtor, even though the creditors 
were not being paid in full.76 The owners paid for their new eq-
uity under the plan by a contribution of capital to the reor-
ganized debtor.77 
The problem in 203 N. LaSalle, though, was that, under 
the plan, only the existing equity holders in the old debtor were 
given the opportunity to buy the equity in the new, reorganized 
entity that would emerge from chapter 11.78 No one else was 
given that opportunity, and the equity in the new, reorganized 
debtor had not been exposed to the market for higher and better 
bids.79 It was “the exclusiveness of the opportunity, with its pro-
tection against the market’s scrutiny of the purchase price by 
                                                                                                            
paid in full under the plan. Douglas wrote, relying on equity receivership case 
law for the rule: “It is, of course, clear that there are circumstances under 
which stockholders may participate in a plan of reorganization of an insolvent 
debtor.” Id. at 121. Douglas stressed “the necessity, at times, of seeking new 
money ‘essential to the success of the undertaking’ from the old stockholders. 
Where that necessity exists and the old stockholders make a fresh contribution 
and receive in return a participation reasonably equivalent to their contribu-
tion, no objection can be made.” Id. at 122. A strange aspect of the 203 N. LaSalle 
decision is the Court’s reluctance—sixty years later—to decide whether the 
new value exception even exists under the Code, given that Congress said 
nothing of it when it replaced the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 with the Code in 
1978. Justice Souter, who wrote the 203 N. LaSalle opinion, spent much of that 
opinion considering but never deciding the issue. 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 
444–49. In the end Souter wrote: “It is enough to say, assuming a new value 
corollary, that plans providing junior interest holders with exclusive opportunities 
free from competition and without benefit of market valuation fall within the 
prohibition of § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii),” which sets forth the absolute priority that is 
applicable to a chapter 11 cramdown plan. Id. at 458. Justice Stevens in dissent 
wrote, “enough already” (to paraphrase generously), reasoning that the Court 
had twice previously granted certiorari on the issue of whether the new value 
exception to the absolute priority rule existed under the Code. Id. Justice 
Stevens “believe[d] the Court should now definitively resolve the question and 
state that a holder of a junior claim or interest does not receive property ‘on 
account of’ such a claim”—and thus the rule is not violated—“when its partic-
ipation in the plan is based on adequate new value.” Id. at 464. 
76 See 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 436. 
77 See id. at 440. 
78 See id. 
79 See id. at 457. 
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means of competing bids or even competing plan proposals,” that 
lead the Court to conclude that the opportunity of old equity to 
own the reorganized entity arose from and was “extended ‘on 
account of’ the old equity position.”80 Because the owners of the 
company had set aside for themselves the equity in the reor-
ganized company, under a priority-skipping plan and supported 
by a hypothetical valuation of that equity that lacked market 
exposure, the Court reversed the bankruptcy court’s confirma-
tion of the plan.81 
While the Court in 203 N. LaSalle needed to consider 
whether the new value exception could be found in the Code, the 
Court in Jevic found it necessary to acknowledge that the absolute 
priority rule has a somewhat limited reach under the express 
provisions of the Code.82 The rule expressly applies to a liquida-
tion under chapter 7.83 But “Chapter 11 plans provide somewhat 
more flexibility.” Though the rule applies to a “cram-down” plan 
in chapter 11 (i.e., a plan that one or more classes of creditors 
has voted against) the rule does not apply to a consensual plan 
which all impaired classes of creditors have voted to accept.84 
The Court conceded, moreover, a “statutory silence” with respect 
to whether the absolute priority rule applies to a non-consensual 
chapter 11 structured dismissal, such as the one in Jevic.85 
                                                                                                            
80 Id. at 456. 
81 See id. at 458. 
82 See Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 987. 
83 See 11 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2012) (limiting the absolute priority rule of § 726 to 
chapter 7); § 726 (setting forth the absolute priority rule applicable in chapter 7). 
84 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (2012) (setting forth the absolute priority rule ap-
plicable to a chapter 11 cramdown plan); §§ 1129(a)(8), (10)(b)(1) (limiting the 
absolute priority rule of § 1129(b)(2) to a chapter 11 cramdown plan). Credi-
tors vote on a chapter 11 plan by classes. A class of claims accepts, i.e., votes 
in favor of a chapter 11 plan if more than one-half of the voting creditors in class, 
who hold at least two-thirds of the dollar amount of the claims voted in that 
class, have voted to accept the plan. § 1126(c). Thus, even a chapter 11 “con-
sensual plan” does not require unanimity of creditors, because many creditors 
within each accepting class may nonetheless have voted against confirmation 
of the plan. 
85 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 984. (The absolute priority rule is far from pervasive 
or immutable under U.S. bankruptcy law.); see, e.g., John D. Ayer, Rethinking 
Absolute Priority after Ahlers, 87 MICH. L. REV. 963, 974–76 (1989); Douglas 
G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Control Rights, Priority Rights, and the 
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The Court nonetheless extended the absolute priority rule 
to the structured dismissal before it.86 It emphasized that the 
“Code’s priority system constitutes a basic underpinning of busi-
ness bankruptcy law” and “has long been considered fundamen-
tal to the Bankruptcy Code’s operation.”87 The Court would expect 
that, “if Congress actually meant to make structured dismissals a 
backdoor means” to achieve a non-consensual priority-skipping 
final distribution, such as in Jevic, it would “see some affirma-
tive indication of intent.”88 
The Court expressed a number of concerns with the priority-
skipping structured dismissal in Jevic, two of which were those 
which gave rise to the absolute priority rule in U.S. bankruptcy 
law.89 These concerns had also informed the Court in 203 N. 
LaSalle, the last case before Jevic in which it considered the abso-
lute priority rule.90 First, the settled claims against the secured 
lenders, Sun Capital and CIT, which were estate assets, were not 
exposed to the market and were instead valued hypothetically by 
the bankruptcy court.91 The Court took issue with the validity of 
that hypothetical valuation.92 Second, the parties on one side of the 
settlement—the debtor’s secured parties and owners—exercised 
                                                                                                            
Conceptual Foundations of Corporate Reorganizations, 87 VA. L. REV. 921, 
928 (2001) (“The existing priority system is an uneasy compromise between 
absolute and relative priority.”); James C. Bonbright & Milton M. Berger-
man, Two Rival Theories of Priority Rights of Security Holders in a Corporate 
Reorganization, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 127 (1928); David A. Skeel, Jr., The Emp-
ty Idea of “Equality of Creditors,” 166 U. PA. L. REV. 699 (2017) (“In current 
practice, the most notable feature of the equality of creditors norm is how 
easily a debtor can evade it. Although there may not be fifty ways to sidestep the 
norm, the modes of escape are quite numerous,” citing PAUL SIMON, 50 WAYS 
TO LEAVE YOUR LOVER (Columbia Records 1975)). Congress, moreover, has 
consistently and materially circumscribed the rule since the Supreme Court’s 
decision in L.A. Lumber. See Bruce Grohsgal, How Absolute is the Absolute Prior-
ity Rule in Bankruptcy? The Case for Structured Dismissals, 8 WM. & MARY. 
BUS. L. REV. 439 (2017). 
86 See Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 983. 
87 Id. at 983–84. 
88 Id. at 984. 
89 Id. at 980. 
90 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 434. 
91 See Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 980. 
92 See id. at 983, 986. 
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some control over the debtor.93 And the distributions under the 
settlement skipped over the priority unsecured claims asserted 
by the drivers to get to the more junior, non-priority general unse-
cured creditors represented by the creditors committee that was 
on the other side of the settlement.94 Affirming the bankruptcy 
court’s approval of the settlement thus would increase the “risks of 
collusion, i.e., senior secured creditors and general unsecured credi-
tors teaming up to squeeze out priority unsecured creditors.”95 
The Court then considered whether there should be a rare 
case exception to the rule.96 The bankruptcy court in Jevic had 
found that without the priority-skipping distribution, there 
would be no settlement, and without the settlement, the debtor’s 
claim would have no value.97 Faced with “a meaningful return or 
zero,” the bankruptcy court held that the paramount interest of 
the creditors mandated its approval of the settlement and nothing 
in the Code dictated otherwise.98 
The Third Circuit embraced the bankruptcy court’s rea-
soning and affirmed, holding that the bankruptcy court could 
approve a settlement that deviated from absolute distributional 
priorities in the rare case in which there are “specific and credible 
grounds” to justify the deviation, citing the Second Circuit’s deci-
sion in Iridium.99 In the Third Circuit’s view, the bankruptcy court 
in Jevic, “in Solomonic fashion,” had “reluctantly approved the only 
course that resulted in some payment” to unsecured creditors.100 
The Supreme Court, in reversing, expressly rejected this 
“rare case” exception to a case-ending, priority-skipping settlement 
that lacked the consent of all parties.101 The Court emphasized 
again that the hypothetical basis on which the bankruptcy court 
                                                                                                            
93 Id. at 978. 
94 See id. at 978. 
95 Id. at 987. 
96 See Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 986. 
97 See id. at 976. 
98 Official Comm. of Unsec’d Creditors ex rel. Jevic Holding Corp. v. CIT 
Grp./Bus. Credit Inc. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.), 787 F.3d 173, 178–79 (3d 
Cir. 2015). 
99 Id. at 183–84 (citing Motorola, Inc. v. Official Comm. of Unsec’d Creditors 
(In re Iridium Operating LLC), 478 F.3d 452, 466 (2d Cir. 2007)). 
100 Id. at 185. 
101 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 986. 
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had made its “reasonable return or zero” finding had only “equivocal 
support” in the record, leading the Court to “readily imagine 
other cases that turn on comparably dubious predictions.”102 The 
Court also stressed that a rare case exception would depart from 
the protections given by Congress to different kinds of creditors 
in the form of distributional priorities, would alter the bargain-
ing power that arises from those priorities, would increase un-
certainty of outcomes and risks of collusion, and in the end would 
make settlements more difficult to achieve.103 
D.  Circuit Splits Left Unresolved by Jevic—To What Extent Does 
the Absolute Priority Rule Apply to Interim Settlements or 
“First-Day” Distributions in Chapter 11? 
The Jevic Court limited its ruling to a priority-skipping 
structured dismissal with respect to which the skipped over credi-
tors had not consented.104 It also cited with approval a bankruptcy 
court’s approval of a priority-skipping structured dismissal that 
the skipped-over creditors had tacitly approved by their declining 
to object.105 It “express[ed] no view about the legality of structured 
dismissals in general.”106 
The Court viewed interim settlements in chapter 11 that 
are not case-ending differently.107 The Court, though, did not re-
solve the circuit split on this issue between the Fifth Circuit’s 
AWECO holding that extended the absolute priority rule to all 
pre-plan settlements and the longstanding TMT Trailer rule, 
followed by most circuits, that does not require adherence to the 
rule for interim settlements.108 
The Court also did not resolve the rule for approving priority-
skipping “first-day wage orders,” “critical vendor” payments, and 
“roll-ups” that allow a prepetition secured lender who provides 
                                                                                                            
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 986–87. 
104 See id. at 983. 
105 Id. (citing In re Buffet Partners, L.P., No. 14-30699-HDH-11, 2014 WL 
3735804 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2014)). 
106 Id. at 985. 
107 See id. at 983, 985. 
108 Compare United States v. AWECO, Inc. (In re AWECO, Inc.), 725 F.2d 
293, 298 (5th Cir. 1984), with Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT 
Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 441 (1968). 
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new financing after the chapter 11 commences to be paid first on 
its prepetition claim.109 The Court emphasized that “one can 
generally find significant Code-related objectives that the priority-
violating distributions serve.”110 But it did not resolve the circuit 
split on this issue, between the “doctrine of necessity,” under 
which a court pursuant to a first-day order can authorize a pri-
ority-skipping payment of a claim to a creditor who will not sup-
ply services or material essential to the continued operation of 
the debtor’s business, and the Seventh Circuit’s Kmart rule, which 
requires proof that the first-day payment proposed to be made to 
the advantaged creditor will result, eventually, in the same or 
higher distributions to the disadvantaged creditors.111 
The circuit split on interim settlements is further consid-
ered in Part II below, in the context of a proposed use of market 
exposure rather than a mechanical application of the absolute 
priority rule, to preclude misallocations of estate value to insiders 
and other parties who have control over the debtor. The circuit 
split on first-day relief is further considered in Part III below, in 
the context of the court’s inability to obtain full market exposure 
of proposed first-day distributions and the unreliability of the 
hypothetical valuations required by Kmart to be made at the 
first-day hearing in a chapter 11 case, of the distributions that 
will be made at the end of the case. 
II.  INTERIM SETTLEMENTS DISTINGUISHED FROM CASE-ENDING 
TRANSACTIONS UNDER JEVIC AND MARKET EXPOSURE FOR 
CHALLENGED INTERIM SETTLEMENTS POST-JEVIC 
Parties settle numerous claims and disputes over the course 
of a chapter 11 bankruptcy case. The Supreme Court in Jevic 
recognized the difficulty of applying the absolute priority rule to 
an interim settlement, made prior to the end of the case, because 
“the nature and extent of the Estate, and the claims against it are 
not yet fully resolved.”112 The Court held though, that a case-ending 
                                                                                                            
109 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 985. 
110 Id. 
111 Compare In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 467 F.2d 100, 102 n.1 (3d Cir. 1972) 
(doctrine of necessity), with In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 872 (7th Cir. 2004). 
112 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 985 (quoting Motorola, Inc. v. Official Comm. of 
Unsec’d Creditors (In re Iridium Operating LLC), 478 F.3d 452, 464 (2d Cir. 2007)). 
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settlement—that makes “end-of-case distributions of estate as-
sets to creditors of the kind that normally take place in a chapter 7 
liquidation or chapter 11 plan” and to which some affected credi-
tors object—must comply with the absolute priority rule.113 
The Court did not define what kind of a settlement, other 
than a structured dismissal, it considered to be case-ending.114 
Nor did it state a rule for a bankruptcy court’s approving an 
interim settlement or resolve the circuit split on that issue.115 
This Part suggests, first, that the Court recognized in its 
Jevic opinion that there are both temporal and substantive as-
pects to the question of whether a settlement and the distributions 
under it are interim rather than end-of-case. Second, this Section 
proposes that, for an interim settlement that is challenged as 
priority-skipping and/or case-ending, the estate claims and other 
assets that are included in the proposed settlement can, in many 
cases, be exposed to the market in a manner that deprives control-
ling and colluding parties of any premium, thus addressing the 
problem sought to be remedied by the absolute priority rule. 
A. What Is an Interim as Opposed to an End-of-Case Settlement 
and Distribution? 
The Jevic Court did not define what makes a settlement 
interim, to which the absolute priority rule does not apply, as 
opposed to case-ending, such as the structured dismissal in Jevic 
to which the rule does apply.116 The Court suggested, though, two 
factors: one temporal and the other substantive.117 
1. The Temporal Component and the Circuit Split on the  
Extension of the Absolute Priority Rule to Interim  
Settlements 
Temporally, a settlement approved contemporaneously with 
the dismissal of the case, as in Jevic, clearly is case-ending.118 At 
                                                                                                            
113 Id. at 984. 
114 See id. at 985. 
115 See id. 
116 See id. at 985–86. 
117 See id. at 985. 
118 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 985–86. 
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what time though, in the vast temporal middle of a typical chapter 
11 bankruptcy case, might a proposed settlement be found case-
ending and thus trigger compliance with the absolute priority 
rule under Jevic?119 If the court approves the settlement prior to 
the debtor’s filing a motion to dismiss the case, for example, and 
the debtor moves for dismissal on the next day, or the next 
week, or the next month, or even the next year, is the settlement 
case-ending? 
The Court did not elaborate on how near in time a settle-
ment must be to the expected closing of the bankruptcy case for 
it to be potentially case-ending.120 But a definition of “end-of-
case” based solely on the temporal proximity of the settlement to 
the closing of the case would in many cases elevate form over 
substance, encourage parties to game the rule, and accomplish 
little by way of preventing control premiums and asserted misal-
locations of estate value based on control and collusion.121 
The Court could have resolved the temporal problem of 
what is case-ending by adopting a per se rule.122 Under a per se 
rule, any interim settlement outside of a plan, reached at any 
time in the chapter 11 case, must comply with the absolute pri-
ority rule.123 
One circuit court, the Fifth Circuit in In re AWECO, Inc., 
had so held.124 The Court in Jevic did not.125 While it applied the 
absolute priority rule to an end-of-case settlement, it expressly 
declined to extend the rule’s reach to an interim settlement, or 
to resolve the circuit split on this issue.126 
                                                                                                            
119 See id. at 985–87. 
120 Id. at 987. 
121 Id. at 977. 
122 Id. (explaining how the Court did not adopt a bright line rule to determine 
when a settlement is case-ending).  
123 See id. 
124 See In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d at 293, 298. 
125 See Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 977. 
126 See id. at 985–86; see also 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2012) (The Bankruptcy 
Code and Rules are silent on the issue of whether the absolute priority rule 
applies to an interim settlement. Code section 363(b) authorizes the debtor’s sale 
or use of estate property “out of the ordinary course of business,” such as in a 
settlement, so long as the bankruptcy court approves.). Settlements outside of 
a plan are authorized pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9019. That Rule provides 
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It might have been otherwise. The question originally pre-
sented to the Court in Jevic, on which it granted certiorari, was: 
“[w]hether a bankruptcy court may authorize the distribution of 
settlement proceeds in a manner that violates the statutory pri-
ority scheme.”127 The petitioners had argued in their application 
for certiorari that the Third Circuit’s decision in Jevic “‘deepened an 
existing ... split among the Courts of Appeals on this question.”128 
On one side of this split was the Fifth Circuit’s decision 
establishing the per se rule in AWECO.129 Under AWECO, a pro-
posed settlement or other use of estate property must comply 
with the absolute priority rule from the first day of the chapter 
11 case.130 The court observed that the terms “fair and equitable,” 
which apply to confirmation of a chapter 11 cramdown plan, are 
“terms of art—they mean that ‘senior interests are entitled to 
full priority over junior ones.’”131 It held that the rule arises “as 
                                                                                                            
that, “after notice and a hearing, the court may approve a compromise or settle-
ment.” FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019(a). Neither Code section 363 nor Rule 9019 
refer to distributional priorities or the absolute priority. Since the Code be-
came effective in 1978, most lower courts have applied variations of the risk-
benefit standard set forth in the Supreme Court’s decision in TMT Trailer (a 
chapter X corporate reorganization case under the Bankruptcy Act) to decide 
whether to approve a chapter 11 settlement. TMT Trailer does not require a 
pre-plan settlement to adhere to the absolute priority rule. TMT Trailer, 390 
U.S. at 414, 418. Rather, a court considering a proposed pre-plan settlement 
must consider the potential benefits and risks of the debtor’s continuing to 
litigate, as compared with what the debtor gains and gives up by the settle-
ment. Specifically, the court must evaluate the probability that the debtor will 
succeed in the litigation, the difficulties that the debtor might have in collecting 
a judgment, the complexity of the litigation, the expense, inconvenience and 
delay in pursuing it, and the interests of creditors and their reasonable views 
regarding whether the settlement is advisable. 10 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 
9019.02 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2009). 
127 See Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 987 (Thomas, J., joined by Alito, J. dissenting). 
128 Id. 
129 See In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d at 298. 
130 See id. 
131 Id. (quoting SEC v. Am. Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594 (1965) (Act 
case)). The AWECO court extended to a pre-plan settlement the meaning of “fair 
and equitable” that applies to a chapter 11 cramdown plan—i.e., a plan which 
some impaired classes voted to accept and some voted to reject, and to which 
the absolute priority rule applies. Section 1129(b)(1) requires a cramdown plan to 
be “fair and equitable” for the bankruptcy court to confirm it. Section 1129(b)(2) 
provides that, for such purpose, “the condition that a plan be fair and equitable” 
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soon as a debtor files a petition for relief,” and “does not suddenly 
appear during the process of approv[al] a plan of compromise.”132 
Moreover, if the standard had no application before confirmation 
of a reorganization plan, then bankruptcy courts would have the 
discretion to favor junior classes of creditors so long as the ap-
proval of the settlement came before the plan.”133 The AWECO 
court’s understanding of “bankruptcy law’s underlying policies” 
led it to extend the rule, and it held that “a bankruptcy court abuses 
its discretion in approving a settlement with a junior creditor unless 
the court concludes that priority of payment will be respected as 
to objecting senior creditors.”134 
On the other side of the split was the Second Circuit’s de-
cision in Iridium and the Third Circuit’s decision in Jevic.135 The 
Iridium court emphasized the need for flexibility in pre-plan settle-
ments, while conceding that such flexibility “has its costs.”136 It 
held that if a party (the unsecured creditors’ committee in that 
case) “reaches a settlement that in some way impairs the rule of 
priorities, it must come before the bankruptcy court with specific 
and credible grounds to justify the deviation and the court must 
carefully articulate its reasons for approval of the agreement.”137 
The Third Circuit in Jevic agreed with the Second Cir-
cuit’s standard for approval of an interim settlement in chapter 
11, and rejected the Fifth Circuit’s per se application of the abso-
lute priority rule to all interim settlements.138 The Third Circuit 
emphasized its view that the Code and the Bankruptcy Rules 
“leave bankruptcy courts more flexibility in approving settlements 
than in confirming plans of reorganization.”139 Conceding that it 
                                                                                                            
includes the distributional requirements of the absolute priority rule. 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 1129(b)(1)–(2) (2012). 
132 In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d at 298. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Motorola, Inc. v. Official Comm. of Unsec’d Creditors (In re Iridium Op-
erating LLC), 478 F.3d 452, x (2d Cir. 2007); Official Comm. of Unsec’d Creditors 
ex rel. Jevic Holding Corp. v. CIT Grp./Bus. Credit Inc. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.), 
787 F.3d 173, x (3d Cir. 2003). 
136 In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d at 452, 466. 
137 Id. 
138 In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d at 173, 184. 
139 Id. 
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was “a close call,” the court concluded that the bankruptcy court 
had sufficient reason to approve the settlement and structured 
dismissal of Jevic’s chapter 11 case, even though it was priority-
skipping, because doing so was the “least bad alternative.”140 
The Supreme Court in Jevic might have resolved this issue, 
but it did not.141 In one of the more peculiar procedural paths taken 
in the Court’s history, the petitioners—after the Court granted 
certiorari—recast the question presented to ask instead: “[w]hether 
a Chapter 11 case may be terminated by a ‘structured dismissal’ 
that distributes estate property in violation of the Bankruptcy 
Code’s priority scheme.”142 
Both the original question and the reformulated question 
stated by the appellants involved priority-skipping.143 But, as 
Justice Thomas protested in his dissent, “the recast question” was 
“narrower—and different”—than the one on which the Court had 
“granted certiorari.”144 It was “also not the subject of a circuit con-
flict.”145 The majority opinion in the Jevic opinion did not so 
much as mention the circuit split or AWECO or its per se rule.146 
In any event, the Court declined to draw the bright tem-
poral line that it might have, had it decided either that the rule 
of distributional priorities arises on the filing of the bankruptcy 
petition and thus applies to all interim or other pre-plan settle-
ments and transactions or that it does not apply to those settle-
ments and transactions at all.147 The facts instead hit the prism 
of the reformulated question that limited the Court’s holding to 
                                                                                                            
140 Id. at 184–85. 
141 Id. at 987. 
142 Id. 
143 See id. at 978. 
144 Id. at 987–88. 
145 Id. The split was not quite as sharp as stated because the Fifth Circuit 
itself was not completely consistent in following In re AWECO, Inc. See, e.g., 
Sandoz v. Bennett (In re Emerald Oil Co.), 807 F.2d 1234, 1239 (5th Cir. 
1987) (affirming settlement with no mention of whether it complied with the 
absolute priority rule); Texas Extrusion Corp. v. Lockheed Corp. (In re Texas 
Extrusion Corp.), 844 F.2d 1142, 1158–59 (5th Cir. 1988) (affirming settle-
ment contained in plan because it was not an “abuse of discretion” without 
mention of whether the settlement complied with the absolute priority rule), 
aff’g 68 B.R. 712 (N.D. Tex. 1986). 
146 See Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 977–87. 
147 See id.  
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an end-of-case structured dismissal.148 Yet the Court cast some 
light on another, substantive aspect of whether an interim set-
tlement or transaction should be considered case-ending and thus 
require compliance with the absolute priority rule.149 This aspect 
of the question is discussed below. 
2. The Substantive Component—Settlements Lacking  
Market Exposure That Predetermine Final Distributions 
to Creditors 
A proposed settlement or other transaction may be sub-
stantively case-ending, even though it is temporally interim, if 
the proposed transaction predetermines final distributions to 
creditors or equity holders absent a process that enables a court 
to determine that the transaction shows a proper solicitude for 
the absolute priority rule.150 
I suggest in this Section that the procedural safeguards 
identified by the Court in its recent jurisprudence—specifically 
Jevic in 2017 and 203 N. LaSalle in 1999—are procedures that 
expose the estate assets at issue to the market rather than those 
for confirmation of a chapter 11 plan.151 The starting point is the 
Jevic Court’s contrasting characterization of the pre-plan trans-
actions in Braniff and Chrysler.152  
The Jevic Court analogized to—and cited with disfavor—
the proposed settlement and sale transaction in In re Braniff 
Airways, Inc. among the debtor and certain of its secured and 
unsecured creditors.153 It characterized the Braniff transaction 
as “an attempt to ‘short circuit the requirements of Chapter 11 
for confirmation of a reorganization plan by establishing the 
terms of the plan sub rosa in connection with a sale of assets.’”154 
The Court, citing Braniff, stressed that the structured dismissal 
resembled “proposed transactions that lower courts have refused 
                                                                                                            
148 Id. at 983.  
149 Id. at 983–87.  
150 See id. at 978. 
151 These procedures are similar to those by which operating business en-
terprises commonly are sold in bankruptcy proceedings, pursuant to section 
363(b) of the Code, and prior to a chapter 11 plan. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b). 
152 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 977–87. 
153 Id. at 978. 
154 Id. (quoting In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d 935, 940 (5th Cir. 1989). 
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to allow on the ground that they circumvent the Code’s proce-
dural safeguards.”155 
Yet, the Jevic Court regarded Chrysler differently, though 
it too was a pre-plan sale case.156 The Court quoted favorably the 
Second Circuit’s determination that the bankruptcy court that 
approved the Chrysler sale had “demonstrated ‘proper solicitude 
for the priority between creditors and deemed it essential that 
the [s]ale in no way upset that priority.’”157 
The Jevic Court framed the issue in terms of whether a 
proposed interim settlement or other pre-plan transaction satisfies 
the “Code’s procedural safeguards.”158 But the issue was hardly 
procedural. The debtor in each of Braniff and Chrysler had equally 
circumvented the procedures for plan confirmation that safeguard 
creditors and other parties in interest in chapter 11.159 Those pro-
cedures include filing a chapter 11 disclosure statement and plan; 
giving creditors and other parties notice and an opportunity to ob-
ject to court approval of the disclosure statement and confirmation 
of the plan; obtaining court approval of the disclosure statement on 
a finding that it contains adequate information about the plan; 
transmitting the court-approved disclosure statement to the parties 
                                                                                                            
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 978 (quoting Ind. St. Police Pens. Tr. v. Chrysler, 
LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir. 2009)). 
158 Id. at 986. 
159 Structured dismissals and pre-plan sales both have been criticized as a 
means by which debtors and creditors can evade the statutory procedures required 
for confirmation of a chapter 11 plan. See Nan Roberts Eital et al., Structured 
Dismissals, or Cases Dismissed Outside of Code’s Structure?, 30 AM. BANKR. INST. 
J. 20, 20 (2011) (“Structured chapter 11 dismissals ignore important chapter 11 
safeguards that structured dismissals omit, including voting, acceptance, disclo-
sure and the ‘fair and equitable’ standards, including the absolute-priority rule.”); 
Jonathan C. Lipson, The Secret Life of Priority: Corporate Reorganization After 
Jevic, 90 WASH. L. REV. 631, 634 (2018) (emphasizing disclosure and voting as the 
two key participatory features of the chapter 11 plan process); Mark J. Roe & 
David Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 MICH. L. REV. 728, 735–36 
(2010) (Terms of a pre-plan bankruptcy sale “determine core aspects that would 
normally be handled under § 1129, with disclosure, voting under § 1129(a)(8), 
and if voting fails, via a judicial cramdown under § 1129(b),” which requires 
compliance with the absolute priority rule. “If the restructuring is done via 
§ 363, courts need to resolve how to reconcile such sales with § 1129. ... But 
fast sales with some priority determinations can be reconciled. The court can 
identify the offending feature of the § 363 sale and ascertain whether it’s small 
and whether priority determination would have passed muster under § 1129.”). 
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entitled to vote on the plan; soliciting the vote and acceptance of 
the plan by one or more impaired classes of creditors who are enti-
tled to vote and, in some cases, from the holders of equity; and 
obtaining the bankruptcy court’s confirmation of the plan follow-
ing a confirmation hearing at which the bankruptcy judge con-
siders the vote, hears the objections, and then determines whether 
the plan has met all of the requirements for confirmation.160 
Put bluntly, the debtor in Braniff and Chrysler equally 
flaunted the procedural safeguards of chapter 11.161 The debtor 
in neither Braniff nor Chrysler had proposed a chapter 11 plan at 
the time it sought the bankruptcy court approval of the sale.162 
Each debtor instead sought court approval of a sale, upon con-
summation of which the company would have new owners and 
new, restructured debt, and would for practical purposes have 
reorganized without following any of the procedures required for 
confirmation of a chapter 11 plan.163 
Why then did the Jevic Court suggest that the Braniff sale 
had circumvented—while the Chrysler sale had satisfied—“the 
Code’s procedural safeguards?”164 Stated another way, what are 
the required “procedural safeguards” for approval of an interim 
settlement or other pre-plan transaction in a chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy case? 
                                                                                                            
160 The Fifth Circuit in Braniff, in reversing the lower court’s approval of the 
section 363(b) sale in that case, admonished: “In any future attempts to specify 
the terms whereby a reorganization plan is to be adopted, the parties and the 
district court must scale the hurdles erected in Chapter 11. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1125 (disclosure requirements); § 1126 (voting); § 1129(a)(7) (best interest of cred-
itors test); § 1129(b)(2)(B) (absolute priority rule).” In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 
700 F.2d 935, 940 (1989). 
161 Ind. St. Police Pens. Tr. v. Chrysler, LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 
108, 127 (2d Cir. 2009); In re Braniff, 700 F.2d at 939–40. 
162 In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 127; In re Braniff, 700 F.2d at 939–40. 
The Chrysler sale, moreover, was consummated at lightning speed—forty-one 
days from the bankruptcy filing. Chrysler filed its chapter 11 petition on 
April 30, 2009, the date on which the debtor entered into a Master Transaction 
Agreement for the sale of its business and substantially all of its assets to a new 
entity, New Chrysler, in which the major investor was Fiat S.p.A. The court ap-
proved bidding procedures on May 5. No other bids for the business or assets 
were obtained. The court held hearings from May 27 to May 29 on whether to ap-
prove the proposed sale and the bankruptcy court approved the sale on June 1. 
The sale closed on June 10. In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 111–12, 118. 
163 In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 111–12; In re Braniff, 700 F.2d at 938, 
939–40. 
164 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 986 (citing In re Braniff, 700 F.2d at 940). 
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I suggest that the answer depends, first, on whether a 
market exposure of the debtor’s assets involved in the proposed 
transaction resulted in a reliable determination of the value of those 
assets. That determination, second, can provide the clarity required 
for the bankruptcy court to determine whether the distributions 
to be made pursuant to the transaction substantively distribute 
value in accordance with the Code’s distributional priorities or 
misallocate estate value to parties who exercise control over the 
debtor or have colluded with them. Support for this conclusion can 
be inferred from Braniff, 203 N. LaSalle, and Chrysler, and the 
Supreme Court’s 1999 decision in 203 N. LaSalle.165 
The interim settlement and sale in Braniff is the iconic 
improper sub rosa plan transaction under the Code.166 Neither the 
debtor’s claims proposed to be settled (by cross-releases among 
the settling parties) nor the debtor’s assets proposed to be sold 
had been exposed to the market.167 No chapter 11 plan had been 
filed and the parties provided no evidence that the distributions 
to be made pursuant to the transaction complied with the priori-
ties for a plan.168  
Under the proposed settlement in Braniff, the debtor would 
sell and transfer the slots and its terminal leases, cash, airplanes 
and equipment to the new operator in return for “travel script, 
unsecured notes, and a profit participation[.]”169 The travel script 
entitled the holder to travel on the new airline and “[could] be used 
only in a future ... reorganization.”170 The script would be issued 
                                                                                                            
165 See generally Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct.; In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d; 203 
N. LaSalle, 526 U.S.; In re Braniff, 700 F.2d.  
166 See In re Braniff, 700 F.2d at 937–41. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 938. The Braniff settlement and sale transaction arose after the 
Federal Aviation Administration allocated the debtor’s landing slots to other carri-
ers. The unsecured creditors committee asserted that the slots were property 
of the estate and sought a declaration that the allocation constituted a violation of 
the automatic stay and of a temporary restraining order previously entered in 
the case. (The automatic stay prohibits “any act to obtain possession of property 
of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property 
of the estate” without court approval. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a)(3), (d) (2012)). The 
parties resolved the committee’s motion by the FAA’s agreeing to return the 
slots to the debtor if the debtor or its successor recommenced operations. The 
debtor and certain secured and unsecured creditors then entered into the 
proposed settlement of claims and potential litigation. 
169 In re Braniff, 700 F.2d at 939. 
170 Id. 
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only to the debtor’s former employees, shareholders, and unse-
cured creditors, without any regard to the distributional priorities of 
their respective claims.171 The Fifth Circuit found that the transac-
tion “had the practical effect of dictating some of the terms of any 
future reorganization plan,” including because any “reorganization 
plan would have to allocate the scrip according to the terms of the 
PSA agreement or forfeit a valuable asset.”172 Any future attempt to 
specify the terms of a chapter 11 plan, it admonished, “would have 
to scale the hurdles erected in Chapter 11,” including the absolute 
priority rule.173 The Jevic Court described the transaction that the 
Fifth Circuit disapproved in Braniff as one that would have “cir-
cumvent[ed] the Code’s procedural safeguards.”174 
Chrysler, by comparison, found favor in the eyes of the Jevic 
Court, for the bankruptcy court’s having demonstrated proper 
solicitude for distributional priorities.175 First and foremost, the 
assets involved in the pre-plan transaction had been exposed to 
the market.176 The Second Circuit, in affirming the bankruptcy 
court, emphasized that court’s findings that the debtor had made 
“prolonged and well-publicized efforts to find a strategic partner 
or buyer.”177 Its executives had “circled the globe in search of a 
deal.”178 “Notwithstanding ... highly publicized and extensive 
efforts [made over] two years ... the Fiat transaction [was] the 
only option that [was] currently viable. The only other alterna-
tive was the immediate liquidation of the company.”179 
The second lien lenders in Chrysler challenged the distribu-
tions of the sale proceeds as priority-skipping.180 The market ex-
posure of the assets gave the bankruptcy court a firm ground upon 
which to conclude that the Code’s distributional priorities were 
being respected.181 Specifically, the bankruptcy court found that 
the sale would yield $2 billion of sale proceeds, all of which would 
                                                                                                            
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 940. 
174 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 986. 
175 In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 117–18. 
176 Id. at 118. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. (citing In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 94, 96 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009)). 
180 In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 118. 
181 Id. 
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be paid to the first lien lenders, whose secured claims clearly ex-
ceeded that amount.182 The objecting junior, second lien lenders, 
equally clearly, were out of the money.183 
Moreover, the market sale of the Chrysler assets formed the 
basis for the bankruptcy court’s approval of distributions that were 
challenged as priority-skipping.184 Specifically, the terms of the 
sale required that the equity in the reorganized Chrysler would be 
issued to unsecured creditors, skipping over the second lien lend-
ers.185 The bankruptcy court, having determined that “all the equity 
stakes in New Chrysler were entirely attributable to new value” 
(including government loans), approved the issuance of new equity 
to unsecured creditors, skipping over the second lien lenders.186 
The problem with using hypothetical valuations (as in 
Braniff) rather than market valuations (as in Chrysler) to determine 
compliance with distributional priorities was at the heart of the 
Court’s 1999 decision in 203 N. LaSalle, just as it was in Jevic in 
2017.187 The issue in 203 N. LaSalle was the debtor’s proposal to 
make priority-skipping distributions of equity in the reorganized 
debtor to those in control of the debtor, without exposing the new 
equity to the market.188 Specifically, the plan in 203 N. LaSalle 
was challenged as priority-skipping because it left a large unse-
cured claim (the bank’s deficiency claim) unpaid even though a 
junior interest, the owners of equity in the debtor, would receive 
a distribution in the form of the equity in the new, reorganized 
debtor.189 The market exposure problem was that only those exist-
ing equity holders were given the opportunity to buy the equity in 
the new, reorganized debtor. The “exclusiveness of the opportunity, 
with its protection against the market’s scrutiny of the purchase 
price by means of competing bids or even competing plan proposals” 
                                                                                                            
182 Id. at 117, n.9. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. at 118. The “Indiana Pensioners” challenged the Chrysler sale as “a 
sub rosa plan chiefly because it [gave] value to unsecured creditors (i.e., in the 
form of the ownership interest in New Chrysler provided to the union benefit 
funds) without paying off secured debt in full, and without complying with the 
procedural requirements of Chapter 11.” 
185 In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 118. 
186 Id.  
187 See generally Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 973; 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 434. 
188 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 439–44.  
189 Id.  
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led the Court to conclude that the right to purchase the new equity 
arose from and was “extended ‘on account of’ the old equity posi-
tion.”190 Because the owners of the company had set aside for 
themselves the new equity in the reorganized company, under a 
priority-skipping plan supported by a hypothetical valuation of the 
new equity that lacked market exposure, the Court reversed the 
bankruptcy court’s conversion of the plan.191 
The “proper solicitude for the priority between creditors”192 
shown in Chrysler, but lacking in the Jevic and Braniff transac-
tions and in the 203 N. LaSalle plan, appears to have been demon-
strated by the exposure to the market of the assets implicated in 
the challenged transaction.193 That market exposure in Chrysler 
enabled a court to make an informed determination regarding 
whether estate value had been distributed in accordance with the 
absolute priority rule or had been misallocated in violation of it.194 
Market exposure also formed the basis for the bankruptcy court’s 
approval of apparent priority-skipping in Chrysler, in the form of 
the distribution to unsecured over the second lien secured credi-
tors, because the market exposure showed that the distribution to 
the unsecured creditors was attributable to new value by a con-
tribution or “gift” made by a third party rather than on account 
of the unsecured creditors’ claims.195 No such market exposure 
occurred in Jevic,196 Braniff,197 or 203 N. LaSalle.198 
The Supreme Court emphasized this problem in both Jevic 
and 203 N. LaSalle: in Jevic when it took issue with what it 
characterized as the bankruptcy court’s “dubious predictions” of 
distributional outcomes that would follow from the settlement or 
the absence of it,199 and in 203 N. LaSalle when it wrote that the 
exclusiveness of the opportunity to purchase the equity in the new 
debtor precluded competing bids and thus shielded the transaction 
                                                                                                            
190 Id. at 456. 
191 Id. at 458. 
192 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 986 (quoting In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 118). 
193 Id. at 981; In re Chrysler LLC, F.3d at 118; 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 
440, 456; In re Braniff, 700 F.2d at 940–41. 
194 In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d at 118. 
195 Id. at 119. 
196 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 978, 981. 
197 In re Braniff, 700 F.2d at 940–41. 
198 203 N. Lasalle, 526 U.S. at 440, 456. 
199 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 984. 
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with the insiders from “the market’s scrutiny.”200 The distribu-
tional outcome of an alternate transaction was not put to a market 
test in either case.201 The bankruptcy court, as a result, could 
not determine whether the transaction that it approved included 
a control premium in the form of a discounted price paid by a 
controlling party, i.e., for the release given to the secured lend-
ers in Jevic or for the equity given to the old shareholders in 203 
N. LaSalle.202 
The Jevic Court left open the rule for approval of interim 
settlements in chapter 11, limiting the reach of its dicta to a 
suggestion that some solicitude must be shown to the absolute 
priority rule even when the transaction is not case-ending.203 I 
assert below that market exposure of the estate claims and other 
assets proposed to be transferred or released can address, in 
many cases, the issues of control and collusion that gave rise to 
the absolute priority rule. Market exposure thus can constitute 
the basis on which a bankruptcy court approves an interim set-
tlement challenged on the ground that it includes a priority-
skipping control premium post-Jevic. 
B. Market Exposure for Challenged Interim Settlements 
Post-Jevic to Achieve the Remedial Purposes of the Absolute 
Priority Rule 
The absolute priority rule applies to end-of-case settlements 
post-Jevic.204 More leeway was left for approval of interim set-
tlements.205 The Court provided no precise definition of what might 
be interim as opposed to end-of-case, though as discussed above, 
there are both temporal and substantive aspects to this question.206 
The Court, moreover, suggested that bankruptcy court ap-
proval even of interim transactions must demonstrate some respect 
                                                                                                            
200 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 456. 
201 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 976; 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 441. 
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of a Chapter 11 case cannot, without the consent of the affected parties, deviate 
from the basic priority rules that apply under the primary mechanisms the Code 
establishes for final distributions of estate value in business bankruptcies.”). 
205 Id. at 977, 985. 
206 Id. at 983, 985. 
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for, or as the Second Circuit described it, a “proper solicitude” to 
the absolute priority rule.207 
As set forth below, market exposure of a proposed settle-
ment or other transaction with an insider or other controlling 
party demonstrates a strong solicitude to the absolute priority 
rule.208 The absolute priority rule arose to prevent a threatened 
misallocation of estate value based on control and collusion, 
supported by a hypothetical valuation or a contrived sale rather 
than by a market valuation of estate assets proposed to be dis-
tributed to creditors.209 The Supreme Court in 203 N. LaSalle 
stressed the need for market scrutiny to determine whether a 
control premium was being distributed to existing owners, and 
the Court in Jevic took issue with the bankruptcy court’s hypo-
thetical valuation of the released claim, setting forth its counter-
hypothesis that a settlement that respected ordinary priorities 
remained “a reasonable possibility.”210 
Markets are extensive today—more than they were in the 
19th century when the absolute priority rule arose,211 more than 
in the 1930s when the reorganization provisions were added to the 
Bankruptcy Act,212 and more than in 1978 when the Code was 
enacted.213 Businesses are commonly sold in chapter 11, pursuant 
to court orders that require marketing, competitive bidding pro-
cesses, and public sales.214 Claims trading is extensive in large 
chapter 11 cases, and secured and unsecured claims against a 
chapter 11 debtor freely and regularly change hands.215 
As markets have grown for ever-increasing amounts and 
types of debt and other claims and property, including for the 
                                                                                                            
207 Id. at 986. 
208 See infra text accompanying notes 211–25. 
209 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 984, 987. 
210 Id. at 983; 203 N. Lasalle, 526 U.S. at 456. 
211 Amendments to Bankruptcy Act, ch. 424, 48 Stat. 911 (1934) § 77B(f); 
L.A. Lumber, 308 U.S. at 117, 123. 
212 See generally Chandler Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-696, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) 
(amending the Bankruptcy Act of 1898). 
213 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, The New Face of Chapter 11, 12 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 69 (2004). 
214 Id.  
215 See, e.g., Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Does Chapter 11 Reorgani-
zation Remain a Viable Option for Distressed Businesses for the Twenty-First 
Century?, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 153, 181 (2004) (“distressed debt trading has grown 
to proportions never contemplated” at the time the Code was enacted in 1978.”). 
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assets of insolvent companies, so too has the justifiable distrust 
of hypothetical, judicial valuations of those assets.216 While most 
of the academic literature has focused on going concern or reor-
ganization value, the problem applies equally to a claim that the 
debtor has against a third party.217 Nearly all hypothetical, judi-
cial valuations of a claim will be based on highly speculative 
testimony regarding the time and expense of the debtor’s prose-
cuting the claim, the likelihood of the debtor’s success on the merits, 
and, ultimately, the debtor’s ability to collect on any judgment, 
and the bankruptcy court’s equally speculative determination fol-
lowing its hearing such testimony.218 
A claim that a chapter 11 debtor has against a third party—
whether that third party is or is not an insider—is in one sense 
simply an asset of the estate.219 The claim can be marketed and 
sold to the highest and best buyer who believes that, at the price 
paid, it will make a profit from prosecuting or settling the claim.220 
The claim can be “marketed” to a lawyer, who will prosecute it un-
der a contingency fee agreement that retains for the estate the 
highest and best percentage of any recovery.221 The claim can be 
marketed to an investor who makes the highest and best offer to 
fund the litigation in exchange for a percentage of the proceeds 
of any recovery.222 
                                                                                                            
216 See, e.g., Kenneth Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Valuation Disputes in 
Corporate Bankruptcy, 167 U. PA. L. REV (forthcoming 2018) (citing Walter J. 
Blum, The Law and Language of Corporate Reorganization, 17 U. CHI. L. REV. 
565, 572 (1950) (“[Judicial value] can never be objectively ascertained or verified 
but always remains in the realm of opinion or belief.”)). 
217 Id. 
218 See id. 
219 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2012) (property of a debtor’s bankruptcy estate 
includes “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the 
commencement of the case”); CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 
397 (2d ed. 2009) (“Virtually all of the debtor’s property is swept into the 
estate ….” Legislative history explains that property of the estate includes 
“causes of action”) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 367 (1977)). 
220 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (a chapter 11 debtor, “after notice and a hear-
ing, may use, sell, or lease, outside the ordinary course of business, property 
of the estate.”); In re Joseph, 330 B.R. 87 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2005). 
221 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 983. 
222 See, e.g., In re Charlotte Com. Group, Inc., No. B-01-52684 C-7W, 2002 
WL 31055241 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2002); Carmel, supra note 35, at 16–17. This 
 
100 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:061 
The process by which a chapter 11 debtor obtains authority 
to market and sell estate assets, including the debtor’s business, 
through a competitive bidding process is well-developed.223 Chap-
ter 11 debtors regularly seek bankruptcy court approval of bidding 
procedures that provide for competitive bidding and, ultimately, 
an auction of the estate assets being sold.224 This process often 
involves the debtor’s having obtained an initial bidder for the 
assets, whose offer is subject to higher and better bids.225 Courts 
typically approve these procedures if they will encourage rather 
than chill the bidding for the assets, and thereby maximize the 
value that will be obtained from the sale of the assets.226 
Can market exposure of the assets involved in a settle-
ment that is challenged as case-ending and/or priority-skipping 
be used to determine whether the distributions under the set-
tlement include a control premium, or instead properly allocate 
value to the debtor’s creditors and shareholders? I suggest that, 
in many cases, it can. 
Consider again the following example set forth in the In-
troduction to this Article. The debtor proposes to settle the debtor’s 
claim against an insider by releasing the insider in exchange for 
                                                                                                            
approach also has been urged to address certain asserted inadequacies in large-
scale, small-claim and derivative litigation. See, e.g., Jay Tidmarsh, Auctioning 
Class Settlements, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 227 (2014); Geoffrey P. Miller, Com-
peting Bids in Class Action Settlements, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 633 (2003); Jon-
athan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Auctioning Class Action and Derivative: 
A Rejoinder, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 458 (1993); Randall S. Thomas & Robert G. 
Hansen, Auctioning Class Action and Derivative Lawsuits: A Critical Analy-
sis, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 423 (1993); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, 
The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Eco-
nomic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991). 
223 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, The New Face of Chapter 11, 12 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 69 (2004). 
224 See, e.g., Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Does Chapter 11 Reorgani-
zation Remain a Viable Option for Distressed Businesses for the Twenty-First 
Century?, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 153, 194–96 (2004).  
225 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, The New Face of Chapter 11, 12 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 69 (2004); In re O’Brien Environmental Energy, Inc., 181 F.3d 527, 
537 (3rd Cir. 1999).  
226 See, e.g., Del. Bankr. L.R. 6004-1 (2017) (for the disclosures required to 
be made to the bankruptcy court that enable the court to determine whether 
to approve the proposed bidding procedures because they are likely to maxim-
ize value and do not chill bidding). 
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a settlement payment. The question of whether the insider is re-
ceiving a control premium—in the form of having to pay a lower 
settlement price than what the claim is worth (thus also reduc-
ing eventual distributions to other creditors)—is clearly at issue. 
The debtor’s claim against the insider, though, can be marketed 
for outright sale to an arm’s-length third-party buyer, or to an 
investor who will fund the costs of the litigation in return for a 
percentage of any recovery on the claim. A higher and better bid 
for the claim from a third-party buyer or investor removes the 
issue of whether a control premium is being paid to the insider—
the costs and benefits of the transaction are now with the third 
party who is not in control. If, on the other hand, the settlement 
was vigorously marketed and no higher bid was obtained, a strong 
case can be made that the insider’s bid reflects the highest and 
best market price for the claim. The insider is not receiving a 
control premium in the form of a discount because if the claim 
was worth more, a third party would have bid more. 
Consider, as a second example, an interim settlement similar 
to the case-ending settlement in Jevic.227 The debtor has a claim 
against a secured lender who is willing to pay a settlement amount 
to the estate to settle the claim. But the lender will agree to do so 
only if distributions of the settlement amount skip over a group 
of creditors who the lender fears will use their distribution of the 
settlement proceeds as a litigation fund to sue the lender on another 
claim that they have against the lender. The creditors group 
objects to approval of the settlement, arguing that it is priority-
skipping and that the lender has colluded with the debtor’s 
management to exercise control over the debtor at the expense of 
the creditors group. The issue of whether the lender is receiving 
a control premium, in the form of a bargain settlement amount, 
is present. 
The debtor’s claim against the lender, in this example too, 
can be marketed for outright sale to an arm’s-length third-party 
buyer, or to an investor who will fund the costs of the litigation 
in return for a percentage of any recovery on the claim. As with 
the prior example, a higher and better bid for the claim from a 
third-party buyer or investor removes the issue of whether a 
                                                                                                            
227 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 980–82. 
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control premium is being paid to the lender because, again, the 
costs and benefits of the transaction are now with the third party 
who is not in control. If, on the other hand, no higher bid was 
obtained after a vigorous marketing process, the market expo-
sure would indicate that the claim has no value other than to the 
lender, whose bid reflects the highest and best market price for the 
claim, even with the priority-skipping. The lender is not receiving 
a control premium in the form of a discount because, if the claim 
was worth more, a third party would have bid more. The lender 
simply does not want to fund litigation against itself. 
Exposing settlements to market scrutiny can, in sum, ad-
dress the issue of the misallocation of estate value based on control 
and collusion that gave rise to the absolute priority rule. Hypothet-
ical valuations—such as those that concerned the Court in both 
Jevic and 203 N. LaSalle—are poor and suspect substitutes.228 
Issues can be expected to recur in some cases, even if this 
approach is taken. Most turn on the market for and the market-
ing of such claims or other assets. Aspects of both bankruptcy 
and non-bankruptcy law pose other, special issues.229 
Foremost, a rule relying on market exposure requires, to 
state the obvious, a robust marketing and sale process.230 Inade-
quate marketing, restrictions on potential bidders’ access to in-
formation, no-shop provisions, exclusionary bidder qualification 
rules, unnecessary or excessive break-up fees, excessive overbid 
                                                                                                            
228 Id. at 983, 986; 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 456?58. 
229 See infra text accompanying notes 233?37. 
230 Such a marketing process includes establishing a sufficient marketing 
period, providing the necessary information to prospective bidders, contacting 
prospective buyers, negotiating with prospective “stalking horse” bidders one 
of whom will set a floor by making an initial bid, providing an incentive such 
as a breakup fee to the initial bidder (which initial bid will be subject to higher 
bids of other bidders who then bid against it), and establishing overbid mini-
mums and other rules for an auction when more than one prospective bidder 
is obtained. The auction should provide an opportunity to creditors who hold liens 
against the asset being sold to credit bid at the auction. 11 U.S.C. § 363(k) 
(2012). Bankruptcy Judge Frank Santoro (Bankr. E.D. Va.) suggests that the 
bidding procedures approved by the court might also permit credit bidding by 
creditors who hold priority unsecured claims under Code section 507, though 
credit bidding by priority unsecured creditors is not expressly provided for in 
the Code. 11 U.S.C. §§ 507, 363(k) (2012). 
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requirements, and similar provisions that chill rather than en-
courage bidding will skew the market exposure and reduce the 
market price.231 To the extent that these flaws favor an insider, 
they make a control premium more likely.232 Bankruptcy courts 
have developed court rules and precedents that encourage a 
warm and healthy bidding process and many courts have exten-
sive experience in ruling on these bidding procedure issues in a 
manner that maximizes market exposure in connection with any 
auction of a debtor’s assets.233 But absent a bankruptcy court’s 
rigorous application of such rules the market exposure will be 
lost, the value of estate assets and distributions to creditors will 
diminish, and control premiums will be paid.234 
“Gifting” by a senior stakeholder, such as by a secured credi-
tor to a junior stakeholder, that skips over an intermediate stake-
holder, poses a related bankruptcy law issue.235 The question for the 
bankruptcy court is whether such distribution is a “true gift” 
because it is made from the secured creditor’s property or is dis-
guised priority-skipping because the distribution is made from 
estate assets.236 Market exposure of the estate’s assets resolves 
                                                                                                            
231 See, e.g., In re O’Brien Environmental Energy, Inc., 181 F.3d 527 (3d 
Cir. 1999) (considering whether proposed break-up fee would encourage bidding on 
the debtor’s assets, and thus maximize value, or would instead chill that bidding 
by driving away prospective competing bidders to the detriment of the debtor’s 
estate and creditors).  
232 See, e.g., Bank of Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 
526 U.S. 434, 444 (1999) (citing H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. I, p. 255 (1973) (dis-
cussing concern with “the ability of a few insiders, whether management or 
major creditors, to use the reorganization process to gain an unfair advantage”)); 
In re O’Brien Environmental Energy, Inc., 181 F.3d at 536 (asking whether 
the relationship of the parties who negotiated the break-up fee was “tainted 
by self-dealing or manipulation”). 
233 See, e.g., 6004-1; In re Family Christian, LLC, 533 B.R. 600 (Bankr. W.D. 
Mich. 2015). 
234 See, e.g., Roe & Skeel, supra note 159, at 747 (criticizing the bidding 
procedures in Chrysler for discouraging competing bids, including by requiring a 
competing bid to “conform substantially to the terms set out in the Treasury’s 
proposed Purchase Agreement,” prohibiting bidders from bidding on Chrysler’s 
assets free of its liabilities, and restricting bids “on other configurations of a 
reorganized Chrysler.”). 
235 In re ICL Holding Co., Inc., 802 F.3d 547, 555 (3d Cir. 2015) (“The Code’s 
distribution rules don’t apply to nonestate [sic] property.”). 
236 Id. 
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this issue in many cases.237 Once the senior secured creditor’s share 
of the estate has been determined by a market sale and its share 
of the sale proceeds have been distributed (or held for ultimate 
distribution) to it, any payment made by it to others is a true 
gift.238 By contrast, a hypothetical valuation of the secured cred-
itor’s collateral, and an allocation of part of that value to a junior 
stakeholder, fails to resolve the question of priority-skipping 
because the valuation is speculative.239 
But while market exposure enables the court to preclude 
control premiums with respect to the settlement of claims that 
                                                                                                            
237 See, e.g., Bank of Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n, 526 U.S. at 455–56 (requir-
ing the opportunity given to insiders to acquire the equity interests in the 
reorganized debtor to be subjected to competing, potentially higher bids by 
third parties). 
238 In In re ICL Holding Co., Inc., decided by the Third Circuit contempo-
raneously with its Jevic decision, the debtor tried to sell its assets to at least 
seven potential “suitors.” The highest third-party bid reflected a recovery to 
the debtor’s secured lenders of only 80–85 percent of their debt. The secured 
lenders exercised their right to credit bid under Code section 363(k), and credit 
bid 90 percent of the face amount of their debt, which was the highest bid for 
the debtor’s assets. The bidding fixed the value of the estate’s assets (including 
the debtor’s cash on hand) at 90 percent of the secured lenders’ claim, which 
is the amount that they paid for the assets pursuant to the credit bid. But a 
secured creditor whose winning bid is less than the amount of its claim pays 
for the assets it purchased by reducing its secured claim by the amount of the 
credit bid, and pays no cash to the estate. So, upon the secured lenders’ success-
ful credit bid, they owned the assets of the estate without having to pay any 
cash for them and nothing was left of the estate. Thus, the up to $1.8 million 
to be paid from the cash on hand to the debtor’s and the creditors committee’s 
lawyers and accountants was not property of debtor’s estate, and the secured 
lenders’ agreement to pay such sum was a “true gift.” In re ICL Holding Co., 
Inc., 802 F.3d at 550?51, 555?56. 
239 In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 432 F.3d 507, 509, 514 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(finding that none of the distributions of estate property had been exposed to 
the market). The plan in Armstrong provided for a distribution to a class of 
unsecured creditors, who would waive their distribution in favor of the owners of 
the common stock of the debtor. The bankruptcy court confirmed the plan. The 
district court reversed, distinguishing a payment by a secured creditor with a 
perfected lien because in such case the collateral is not estate property subject 
to distribution under the Code’s absolute priority rule, and the payment is a 
“carve out” being made from “a portion of its lien proceeds.” The Third Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s reversal of plan confirmation. In re Armstrong, 432 
F.3d at 514. 
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are purely within the estate, and to determine whether a priority-
skipping payment is a “true gift,” the problem becomes more 
difficult if the proposed settlement or gift includes rights that do 
not strictly belong to the estate.240 Some settlements involving 
multiple parties may provide for distributions of assets in which 
both the estate and another party has an interest, and thus are 
outside of what some commentators have described as the “bank-
ruptcy partition.”241 The structured dismissal in Jevic arguably 
extended beyond the partition in one aspect, because by the bank-
ruptcy court’s approving it the drivers lost the power to bring 
their own avoidance action against Sun Capital and CIT based on 
the same leveraged buyout.242 This problem likely will involve a 
fairly small percentage of settlements and other transactions, 
though in some cases it will be very difficult to resolve.243 
Standing issues pose special problems. Questions regard-
ing an assignee’s standing or authority to prosecute a claim may 
suppress the market for the outright purchase of claims from a 
chapter 11 debtor. The outright sale of certain kinds of claims, such 
as a receivable or other contract claim, normally gives standing 
to the purchaser.244 Sales of avoidance actions (such as the one in 
Jevic) or tort claims, though, can present special standing issues 
because some courts have interpreted the Code to limit the pros-
ecution of avoidance actions to the trustee or debtor in possession 
                                                                                                            
240 See Baird et al., The Bankruptcy Partition (Univ. of Chi. Coase-Sandor 
Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 848, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract 
=3110210 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3110210. 
241 Id. 
242 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 983. 
243 Baird et al., supra note 240, at 5. Moreover, bankruptcy jurisdiction is 
essentially in rem. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006). Accord-
ingly, the court’s jurisdiction and authority over property that is not property 
of the bankruptcy estate is highly problematic.  
244 6 Am. Jur. 2d § 134 (Aug. 2018 update) (assignee “stands in the shoes 
of the assignor” and has standing to prosecute claim); 6A C.J.S. Assignments 
§§ 88, 94 (Sept. 2018 update) (“A valid assignment generally operates to vest 
in the assignee the same right title, or interest that the assignor had in the 
thing assigned,” and in “most states, in the absence of a contrary intention, 
an assignee acquires the same rights as the assignor to protect and enforce 
the assigned rights, including the right to maintain a civil action.”); Uniform 
Commercial Code § 9-404 (receivables); 29 Williston on Contracts § 74:56 (4th 
ed.) (under U.C.C. section 9-404, “just as was the case under the common law 
and under the earlier version of the [Uniform Commercial Code], the assignee 
steps into the shoes of the assignor”). 
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(excluding a purchaser of the claim),245 or because the transfer 
might be champertous or “meddlesome” under state law.246 
But courts increasingly allow the sale of such a claim in a 
bankruptcy proceeding when doing so is in the best interest of 
estate and its creditors.247 Some courts have held that a debtor 
                                                                                                            
245 11 U.S.C. § 547(b), 548(1)(a) (2012); Harris Winsberg & Michele J. Kim, 
Unlocking Value: Can a Trustee Sell Avoidance Claims Grounded in Section 
544(B), 547 or 548 of the Bankruptcy Code?, 22 No. 2 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC, NL 
2 ART. 2 (2013).  
 246 “Maintenance” at common law is “an officious intermeddling 
in a suit that in no way belongs to the meddler, and signifies 
an unlawful taking in hand, or upholding of quarrels or sides, 
to the disturbance or hindrance of common right.” “Champerty” 
is a species of maintenance and “is the unlawful maintenance 
of a suit in consideration of part of the matter in controversy.” 
Traditionally, at common law, maintenance and champerty of 
personal injury tort claims has been forbidden based on a policy 
that protected the injured party “so that an unrelated third-
party cannot reap a windfall by paying the injured party a pit-
tance for the claim and then prosecute litigation for injuries that 
the party never suffered.” 
In re Brown, 354 B.R. 100, 105 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 2006). 
247 See, e.g., In re Moore, 608 F.3d 253, 257 (5th Cir. 2010) (“As a general 
matter, a trustee may sell causes of action belonging to the estate.”); In re Mickey 
Thompson Ent. Group, Inc., 292 B.R. 415, 421?22 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2003) (equating 
a settlement of a debtor’s litigation claim with the sale of the claim to the 
defendant, and holding that, when confronted with a motion to approve a 
settlement of a claim, “a bankruptcy court is obliged to consider, as part of 
the ‘fair and equitable’ analysis” applicable to Rule 9019 settlements, whether 
the claim “might draw a higher price through a competitive process and be 
the proper subject of a section 363 sale”); William P. Weintraub & Barry Z. 
Bazian, Avoiding the Avoidable: The Uncertainty of Selling Avoidance Actions, 26 
No. 6 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. NL ART. 2 (2017) (“Several recent decisions have held 
that a trustee was not permitted to assign avoidance claims to a creditor that 
wanted to pursue the claims for the creditor’s own benefit. These decisions 
suggest that the result may have been different had the trustee or creditor 
requested derivative standing to pursue the claims on behalf of the estate.”); 
Winsberg & Kim, supra note 245, at 2 (courts approve such sales under two 
primary approaches: (1) granting derivative standing to the claims purchaser, 
if the suit by the purchaser is in the best interest of the estate and is neces-
sary and beneficial to the fair and efficient resolution of the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding, or if the purchaser is pursuing interests common to all creditors, and 
allowing the purchaser to pursue the claim will benefit the remaining credi-
tors; and (2) analyzing the sale under Bankruptcy Code section 363(b), and 
authorizing the sale if the debtor has articulated a business justification, 
good business judgment, or sound business reasons for the proposed sale, and 
the sale price is the highest and best offer). 
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or trustee must consider a higher bid from a third party for a claim 
that its proposes to settle with the defendant.248 The doctrines of 
champerty and maintenance likely do not apply to marketing 
the claims to a litigation financier, or to a purchaser of a percentage 
of any recovery on the claim, or to a contingency fee law firm, 
which process can provide the market exposure necessary to pre-
vent the payment from the estate of premiums based on control.249 
There also are times when market exposure cannot be ob-
tained or will be limited. Such exposure will be limited, for example, 
at the first-day hearing in a chapter 11 bankruptcy case. I suggest 
in the next Part that a different rule is preferable at that time. 
III. THE TEMPORAL SWAY OF THE ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE—
FIRST-DAY ORDERS AND THE DIFFICULTY OF MAKING A 
HYPOTHETICAL VALUATION OF ULTIMATE ESTATE VALUE AND 
PLAN DISTRIBUTIONS EARLY IN A CHAPTER 11 CASE 
A crucial aspect of the Court’s decision in Jevic is what the 
Court did not do.250 Jevic does not restrict the bankruptcy courts’ 
authority to approve priority-skipping first-day transfers on account 
of certain prepetition claims, including to employees, to customers, 
to certain suppliers who are critical to the chapter 11 debtor’s 
                                                                                                            
248 See, e.g., In re Mickey Thompson Ent. Group, Inc., 292 B.R. at 420–22. 
249 See, e.g., Charge Injection Tech. Inc. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 
C.A. No. N07C-12-134-JRJ, 2016 WL 937400, at *3–4 (Del. Super. Ct. 2016) 
(holding that a litigation financing agreement, under which the defendant 
alleged that the borrower had “signed away all rights to litigation proceeds,” 
but which the court found gave the litigation funder no right to direct, control, 
or settle the claims, was not a champertous assignment because “there was no 
assignment” and the original plaintiff remained the bona fide owner of the 
claims;” nor was it “maintenance involv[ing] officious intermeddling … for 
purposes of stirring up litigation and strife”). See also Carmel, supra note 35, 
at 17 (“Although there has only been a limited number of litigation-finance 
arrangements in bankruptcy to date, nothing prevents a debtor from entering 
into such an arrangement with bankruptcy court approval if necessary. Simply 
put, a debtor’s meritorious litigation claims are assets, and litigation finance 
is often the best way to maximize the value of those assets.”); Kevin LaCroix, 
Delaware Court Rejects Challenge to Litigation Funding Arrangement, LITIG. 
FIN. (Mar. 23, 2016), https://www.dandodiary.com/2016/03/articles/litigation-fi 
nancing-2/delaware-court-rejects-challenge-to-litigation-funding-arrangement/ 
[https://perma.cc/CSV3-SQN5]. 
250 See infra text accompanying notes 258–59.  
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operations, or to a secured lender who, it is proved to the court’s 
satisfaction, is willing to advance needed postpetition funds only 
pursuant to a “roll-up,” under which the lender’s prepetition claim 
is paid down first from the debtor’s postpetition operating reve-
nues.251 It also did not resolve the split between jurisdictions that 
apply the doctrine of necessity and those that apply the Kmart 
rule in determining whether to approve first-day relief.252 
Part III considers, first, the reasons for first-day relief, and, 
second, the circuit split on priority-skipping first-day relief.253 It 
then parses the difficulty of determining eventual enterprise value 
and distributions to creditors under a hypothetical plan, as re-
quired by Kmart.254 
Because, in nearly all cases, this determination will be based 
on conjecture, this Part concludes that the rule going forward 
should presume the benefit of preserving the debtor’s business as a 
going concern. It should require, though, that the chapter 11 debtor 
prove (as is required by the doctrine of necessity) that it diligently 
has sought alternative suppliers in the market, and has failed to 
obtain them. 
This approach addresses the excessive first-day relief of 
which some critics, rightfully, complain.255 It does so without engag-
ing in the unreliable predictions of ultimate distributions required 
by Kmart, and without sacrificing the going concern value, sup-
plier relationships and jobs that first-day relief preserves. 
A. Why First-Day Relief in Chapter 11? 
First-day relief has become a common feature of chapter 11 
practice.256 Hope springs eternal, or nearly so, for many chapter 
11 debtors at the beginning of a bankruptcy case. Chapter 11 
                                                                                                            
251 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 986 (citing DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ELEMENTS OF 
BANKRUPTCY 232–34 (6th ed. 2014); Mark J. Roe & Frederick Tung, Breaking 
Bankruptcy Priority: How Rent-Seeking Upends the Creditors’ Bargain, 99 
VA. L. REV. 1235, 1250–64 (2003)). 
252 See Roe & Tung, supra note 251, at 1255–57. 
253 See infra Section III.A & B. 
254 See infra text accompanying notes 335–77.  
255 See infra Section III.B. 
256 See generally DEBRA L. GRASSGREEN ET AL., FIRST DAY MOTIONS: A GUIDE 
TO THE CRITICAL FIRST DAYS OF A BANKRUPTCY CASE (3d ed. 2012) for a compre-
hensive treatment of first-day relief. 
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gives a struggling business the prospect of a better future, in which 
insurmountable debt is restructured and reduced, and the reor-
ganized debtor returns to profitability.257 
The chapter 11 debtor, though, is in a vulnerable position 
early in the case. Many of the debtor’s employees, customers, sup-
pliers, and lenders may have lost confidence in the enterprise and 
are intent on reducing their own losses and risk, using whatever 
leverage they have. Yet the debtor needs the labor, custom, and 
credit of certain key counterparties to persist and to reorganize. 
First-day relief can be essential to the debtor’s maintaining its 
operations for long enough for it to sell its business as a going 
concern or otherwise reorganize in chapter 11.258 
First-day motions typically are filed by a chapter 11 debtor 
with its voluntary petition.259 Court approval is required.260 
Bankruptcy courts regularly enter first-day orders following the 
first hearing in the case, held within a day or two of the filing of 
the case.261 Common first-day orders include those that permit 
                                                                                                            
257 Id. 
258 See, e.g., In re The Colad Group, Inc., 324 B.R. 208, 212 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 
2005) (“In bankruptcy practice, the phrase ‘first day motions’ refers generally 
to any of a variety of requests made shortly after the filing of a chapter 11 
petition, for prompt authorizations needed to facilitate the operation of the 
debtor’s business.”). 
259 John D. Ayer et al., The Life Cycle of a Chapter 11 Debtor Through the 
Debtor’s Eyes: Part I, ABI J. (Sept. 2003). 
260 Court approval is required under various Code provisions. Code section 
363(c) requires court approval of the chapter 11 debtor’s use of cash in which 
another party, such as the debtor’s secured lender has a lien. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c). 
Code section 364 requires court approval of postpetition secured financing and 
other extensions of credit, other than credit (such as trade credit) that is in the 
ordinary course of the debtor’s business. Id. § 364. Courts restricting a chap-
ter 11 debtor’s ability to pay unsecured prepetition claims prior to the final 
distributions in the case have cited the Code’s silence regarding authority rather 
than an express prohibition in the Code. See, e.g., In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 
at 871. 
261 First-day hearing procedures and orders are authorized by the local 
bankruptcy rules of many jurisdictions. Many bankruptcy courts schedule the 
hearing on these first-day motions for the first or second business day after 
the case is filed. See, e.g., Del. Bankr. L.R. 9013-1(m) (2017) (providing for con-
sideration by the court of motions filed with, or contemporaneously with, the 
chapter 11 petition, on less than seven days’ notice, provided that they are 
“confined to matters of a genuinely emergent nature required to preserve the 
assets of the estate and to maintain ongoing business operations and such other 
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the debtor to pay critical vendors on account of their prepetition 
claims;262 to honor prepetition customer warranties, credits, gift 
cards and promotions;263 and to pay prepetition wages to honor 
paid time off and other benefits earned prepetition by the debt-
or’s employees.264 
B. The Circuit Split on Priority-Skipping First-Day Relief—The 
Doctrine of Necessity and Kmart 
These payments and transfers usually are priority-skipping 
at the time they are made.265 A payment to a critical vendor on 
account of its non-priority prepetition claim, for example, skips over 
                                                                                                            
matters as the Court may determine appropriate”); Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1002-1(b) 
(providing that “[t]o the extent practicable, when a prospective chapter 11 
debtor or chapter 15 petitioner anticipates the need to seek orders for imme-
diate relief, counsel for the debtor or petitioner shall contact the United States 
Trustee and the Clerk prior to filing a voluntary petition for relief under 
chapter 11 or chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, for the purpose of advising 
the United States Trustee and the Clerk of the anticipated filing of the peti-
tion (without disclosing the identity of the debtor or petitioner) and the mat-
ters on which the debtor or petitioner intends to seek immediate relief ”; 
Bankr. S.D. Fla. 9013-1(F) (providing that first-day motions, including those 
for authority to use cash collateral, for approval of postpetition financing, for 
authority to pay postpetition wages outstanding on the petition date, for au-
thority to maintain prepetition bank accounts, and for authority to pay prepe-
tition claims based on the “doctrine of necessity,” shall be scheduled within 
two business days, if reasonably possible). 
262 Critical vendors “are commonly defined as essential vendors or suppliers 
who are indispensable to the debtor’s business—either because of the types of 
goods or services they supply, their knowledge of the debtor’s business, or some 
other unique aspect to the business relationship—and without whom the debtor 
likely cannot achieve a successful reorganization.” ABI Report, supra note 9, 
at 97. Most critical vendor claims are general unsecured claims and are junior to 
unsecured priority claims under Code § 507(a). 
263 Most customer claims are general unsecured claims and are junior to 
administrative expense claims and other unsecured claims that have priority 
under Code § 507(a). See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (2012). 
264 Employee claims for salary and wages are fourth priority unsecured claims 
pursuant to § 507(a)(4), subject to a $12,850 per employee cap, and employee 
benefit claims are fifth priority unsecured claims pursuant to § 507(a)(5), subject 
to a different cap. Both claims are junior to administrative expense claims and 
other unsecured claims that have a higher priority unsecured under Code § 507(a). 
See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)–(b) (2012). 
265 See ABI Report, supra note 9, at 101. 
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holders of priority unsecured claims.266 Payment to an employee 
on account of her lower priority claim for prepetition salary and 
benefits skips over administrative expense claimants (including 
the debtor’s and the creditors committee’s lawyers) who have a 
higher priority.267 All of these claims paid pursuant to first-day 
orders also are junior to secured claims to the extent of the value 
of each secured party’s collateral.268  
The reasons given for priority-skipping first-day orders vary 
somewhat, depending on the type of payment or transfer. If a sup-
plier or service provider who provides an essential product or ser-
vice to the debtor is not paid, it will cease providing the debtor 
with the goods or services;269 if credits owed to customers, or gift 
cards and promotions, are not honored, the debtor will lose its 
customers;270 and if employees are not paid what the debtor owes 
them on the first payday after the commencement of the case, 
                                                                                                            
266 See id. at 98, n.337. 
267 See id. at 98. 
268 “Property interests are created and defined by state law” in a bank-
ruptcy case, under the Supreme Court’s holdings in Butner v. United States, 
440 U.S. 48, 54–55 (1979) (1898 Act case) and Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 
113 S. Ct. 2106, 2109 (1993) (1978 Code case, following Butner). In a debtor’s 
bankruptcy proceeding, state law establishes the extent, validity, and priority 
of liens and other interests in the debtor’s property. Thus, under bankruptcy’s 
distributional priorities, the secured creditor who holds a lien is entitled to 
payment of its claim up to the amount of the value of its collateral prior to 
any payment to unsecured creditors, such as the debtor’s employees and 
customers, whose claims are unsecured. 
269 See, e.g., In re Just for Feet, Inc., 242 B.R. 821, 826 (D.Del. 1999) 
Clearly, Just for Feet cannot survive unless it has name brand 
sneakers and athletic apparel to sell in its stores. The Debtors 
need a continuous supply of inventory from athletic footwear 
and apparel vendors such as Nike, New Balance, Fila, Reebok, 
Adidas, Asics, K-Swiss and Converse. Rockey testified that with-
out new merchandise from these vendors, Just For Feet will not 
survive. Therefore, the court finds that payment of the pre-
petition claims of certain trade vendors—the athletic footwear 
and apparel vendors—is essential to the survival of the debtor 
during the chapter 11 reorganization. 
270 See, e.g., In re Hawker Beechcraft, Inc., 486 B.R. 264, 272 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2013) (first-day customer programs motion approved on testimony that “[a]ny 
interruption or discontinuation of the Customer Programs risks the perma-
nent loss of certain customers.”). 
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they will quit.271 But the underlying rationale is consistent: in 
most cases the debtor and its creditors are better off if the court 
preserves the debtor’s operations and going concern value by 
authorizing the payment.272 
The temporal distinction between transfers made under 
first-day orders, the authority for which the Jevic Court did not 
disturb, and distributions made pursuant to case-ending settle-
ments, which was the focus of the Court, is clear.273 The ultimate 
outcome of the case, with respect to the debtor’s creditors and 
equity holders and the very survival of the company, is specula-
tive at the start of the case.274 The value of the debtor, its assets, 
and the distributions that will be made to creditors at the end of 
the case if the debtor continues to operate its business and reor-
ganizes under a plan are highly speculative.275 Indeed, some 
commentators have described it as “axiomatic” that valuations 
are uncertain at the moment that a debtor files for bankruptcy.276 
At the time of a structured dismissal or other end-of-case 
distribution, by contrast, the die is cast. It is clear at the end of the 
case whether some junior creditors or equity holders are receiv-
ing a distribution prior to payment in full to senior creditors in a 
manner that is inconsistent with the absolute priority rule.277 
Moreover, end-of-case transfers normally have no effect on 
the debtor’s survival or longer-term profitability.278 The purpose 
                                                                                                            
271 ABI Report, supra note 9, at 102 (recognizing that first-day employee 
compensation motions “are often noncontroversial and ultimately granted by 
the court,” because “[m]any courts, debtors, and commentators recognize the 
value to the debtor of receiving uninterrupted service from its employees.”). 
272 See id. at 184, 235 n.792. 
273 See Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 985–86 (discussing priority-violating distribu-
tions and first day wage orders). 
274 See id. at 986 (stating that the results of the case are speculative). 
275 See ABI Report, supra note 9, at 11 n.40 (discussing the uncertainty 
and inefficiencies of the chapter 11 process). 
276 Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the 
Price of Process in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 123 YALE L.J. 862, 896 (2013). Others 
have concluded that “[n]onmarket valuations are necessarily imprecise,” even 
at the end of the case when the plan has been formulated, “and the judge can 
do little more than find that any particular plan falls within a broad range of 
reasonable.” Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Quiet Revolution, 91 AM. L.J. 
593, 594 (2017). 
277 See  Jacoby & Janger, supra note 276, at 890 (absolute priority rule). 
278 See id. at 880 (discussing cases such as Lionel, where creditors failed to 
illustrate the need for speedy transfers). 
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of preserving going concern value by priority-skipping transfers 
often is gone at the end of the case.279 That upside, by then in 
most cases, has been captured or lost.280  
The Jevic Court left undisturbed the bankruptcy courts’ 
authority to grant priority-skipping first-day relief, recognizing 
that “one can generally find significant Code-related objectives” 
that the priority-violating first-day transfers serve.281 The Court 
reasoned that the bankruptcy courts granting such relief “have 
usually found that the distributions at issue would ‘enable a suc-
cessful reorganization and make even the disfavored creditors 
better off.’”282 
The Jevic Court shied away from going further though. In 
particular, the Court did not address the circuit split over the 
two primary rules under which bankruptcy courts grant first-
day relief: the doctrine of necessity, which is applied in the Third 
Circuit and other courts,283 and the Kmart standard, applied by 
                                                                                                            
279 See id. at 881, 894 (elaborating on concern values and speed premiums 
in bankruptcy sales). 
280 See id. at 891 n.115, 894 (analyzing going-concern value and the means 
to preserve it). 
281 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 985. 
282 Id. (quoting In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 872). 
283 In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 467 F.2d at 102 n.1 (Act case) 
A number of cases declare a so-called ‘necessity of payment’ excep-
tion to the normal deferment of the payment of pre-reorganization 
claims until their disposition can be made part of a plan of re-
organization. These cases permit immediate payment of claims 
of creditors where those creditors will not supply services or 
material essential to the conduct of the business until their 
pre-reorganization claims shall have been paid. 
In re Just for Feet, Inc., 242 B.R. at 824 (Code case). Case law tends to use the 
term “doctrine of necessity” and “necessity of payment rule” interchangeably, and 
I have done so in this Article. Some commentators have drawn a distinction 
between the doctrine of necessity, which more precisely applies in chapter 11 
“to authorize the postpetition payment of prepetition employee wages, bene-
fits and services when the failure to make those payments would be cata-
strophic,” and the necessity of payment rule, which more precisely applies in 
railroad reorganizations to authorize the trustee “to pay claims where such 
payment is exacted as the price of providing goods or services indispensably 
necessary to continuing the rail service.” Russell A. Eisenberg & Frances F. 
Gecker, The Doctrine of Necessity and Its Parameters, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 2–3 
(1989) (quoting In re Boston & Maine Corp., 634 F.2d 1359, 1382 (1st Cir. 
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 982 (1981)). The two rules: 
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share the same underlying policy rationale. Both principles are 
premised on the bankruptcy goal of maintaining the prospects 
for a viable reorganization during the early stages of a case. 
Both principles embody the fact that there are some prepeti-
tion creditors who must be paid immediately because if they 
are not paid, everyone else will suffer. 
Id. at 4. Courts that have followed the “doctrine of necessity” or “necessity of 
payment rule” in determining whether to authorize pre-plan payments of prepe-
tition claims include: 1st Cir. court cases: Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Boston 
& Maine Corp. (In re Boston & Maine Corp.), 634 F.2d 1359, 1382 (1st Cir. 1980) 
(Act case) 
[T]he rule is not based on considerations of equity but is a de-
vice for handling a threat to the continued operation of the 
railroad during reorganization ... it would not be a rule con-
ferring a right of recovery on the claimant but a rule of excul-
pation, protecting the trustee who paid under economic duress 
for a supply or service indispensable to continued operation of 
the railroad. 
J.M. Blanco, Inc. v. PMC Mktg. Corp., No. 09-1781(GAG), 2009 WL 5184458, 
at *5 (D.P.R. 2009) (citing In re CoServ, LLC, 273 B.R. 487, 498 (Bankr. N.D. 
Tex. 2002)) (finding necessity of payment authority in Code section 105(a), 
which authorizes the bankruptcy court to enter orders “necessary or appro-
priate to carry out the provisions of” the Bankruptcy Code; the court reasoned 
that the debtor in possession is a fiduciary, with a duty “to protect and pre-
serve the estate, including an operating business’s going concern value,” and 
the bankruptcy court “is authorized to use its equitable powers under section 
105(a) in aid of preservation or enhancement of the estate.”); see also 11 
U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012); In re Zenus Is Jewelry, Inc., 378 B.R. 432, 434 (Bankr. 
D.N.H. 2007) (recognizing doctrine but denying authority to pay critical ven-
dors because the evidence showed that they would supply the debtor on a COD 
basis). 3d Cir. court cases: In re Lehigh & New England Ry. Co., 657 F.2d 
570, 581 (3d Cir. 1981) (railroad receivership case) (citing In re New York, 
New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 278 F. Supp. 592, 602 n.15 (D. Conn. 1967), 
aff’d, 405 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1968), and cert. denied, 349 U.S. 999 (1969)) (“[T]he 
‘necessity of payment’ doctrine ... teaches no more than, if payment of a claim 
which arose prior to reorganization is essential to the continued operation of 
the railroad during reorganization, payment may be authorized even if it is 
made out of corpus.”); In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 467 F.2d at 104; In re 
Just for Feet, Inc., 242 B.R. at 824–25 (Code case); In re Columbia Gas Sys., Inc., 
171 B.R. 189, 191–92 (Bankr. D. Del. 1994) (Code case). 4th Cir. court cases: 
In re Synteen Tech., Inc., No. 00-02203-W, 2000 WL 33709667, at *2 (Bankr. 
D.S.C. 2000) (critical vendor payments); In re NVR L.P., 147 B.R. 126, 128 
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992) (recognizing the necessity of payment doctrine but declin-
ing to authorize the payments because the threat posed by non-payment was 
“too remote and speculative to justify invoking” the doctrine). 5th Cir. court 
cases: In re CEI Roofing, Inc., 315 B.R. 50, 60 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2004) (au-
thorizing first-day wage order on the ground that prepetition wage claims have 
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the Seventh Circuit and other courts, which requires a showing 
that the creditors who do not receive first-day payments will be 
as well off in the reorganization which the first-day payments 
purportedly enable, as they would be in the liquidation that 
might result if the first-day payments were not made to the fa-
vored creditors.284 
The difference between the two rules is fairly simple: the 
doctrine of necessity presumes a benefit in the debtor’s continu-
ing to operate while the Kmart rule requires proof of it. 
The necessity of payment doctrine had its origin in the 
equity receiverships by which railroads were reorganized prior to 
the enactment of the reorganization provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Act in the 1930s.285 The doctrine permits “immediate payment of 
                                                                                                            
priority under Code section 503(a) (3), without considering whether the pay-
ment might ultimately result in priority-skipping, e.g., because senior, ad-
ministrative expense claims ultimately might not be fully paid); In re CoServ, 
LLC, 273 B.R. 487, 498 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002) (CoServ is best characterized 
as a variant of the necessity of payment doctrine: “First, it must be critical that 
the debtor deal with the claimant. Second, unless it deals with the claimant, the 
debtor risks the probability of harm, or, alternatively, loss of economic advantage 
to the estate or the debtor’s going concern value, which is disproportionate to 
the amount of the claimant’s prepetition claim. Third, there is no practical or 
legal alternative by which the debtor can deal with the claimant other than 
by payment of the claim.”); see also B & W Enter. v. Goodman Oil Co. (In re B 
& W Enter.), 713 F.2d 534, 537 (9th Cir. 2010) (declining to extend the neces-
sity of payment doctrine beyond railroad cases to a trucking company) 
Absent compelling reasons, we deem it unwise to tamper with 
the statutory priority scheme devised by Congress in the 1978 
Act. ... Even if we were convinced that the Necessity of Payment 
Rule survived the 1978 Act, appellants have not presented to 
this court sufficient justification for extending the Necessity 
of Payment Rule to trucking reorganizations. 
In re EcoSmart, No. 2:15-bk-27139-RK, 2015 WL 9274245, at *9 (Bankr. C.D. 
Cal. 2015) (only priority prepetition claims, such as employee claims, may be 
paid immediately postpetition under the doctrine of necessity). 
284 See In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 872 (requiring the debtor to show 
that “that the disfavored creditors will be as well off with reorganization as with 
liquidation—a demonstration never attempted” in Kmart (emphasis in origi-
nal)); see also In re Tropical Sportswear Int’l Corp., 320 B.R. 15, 17–18 
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005); In re Corner Home Care, Inc., 438 B.R. 122, 126–27 
(Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2010); In re Jeans.com, Inc., 502 B.R. 250, 253 (Bankr. D.P.R. 
2013); In re United Am., 327 B.R. at 781–82, 784 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2005). 
285 See, e.g., Gregg v. Metro. Tr. Co., 197 U.S. 183, 193 (1905) (“Many cir-
cumstances may exist which may make it necessary and indispensable to the 
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claims of creditors where those creditors will not supply services 
or material essential to the conduct of the business until their 
pre-reorganization claims have been paid.”286 Under the necessity 
of payment doctrine, if a prepetition creditor, by refusing to deal 
with the debtor during reorganization unless its prepetition claims 
are paid, “threatens to make continued operations impossible,” 
then “as a matter of economic necessity” the debtor in possession 
“may properly be permitted to pay such claims, even out of the cor-
pus of the estate.”287 The benefit of the debtor’s continued opera-
tions is presumed.288 
                                                                                                            
business of the road and the preservation of the property, for the receiver to 
pay pre-existing debts of certain classes, out of the earnings of the receiver-
ship, or even the corpus of the property, under the order of the court, with a 
priority of lien. Yet the discretion to do so should be exercised with very great 
care.”); Miltenberger v. Logansport Ry. Co., 106 U.S. 286 (1882). The Chan-
dler Act amended the 1898 Bankruptcy Act to comprehensively provide for 
the confirmation of plans that enabled a reorganization pursuant to chapters 
X (corporate reorganizations), XI (arrangements), XII (real property arrange-
ments for persons other than corporations), and XIII (wage earners’ plans). 
Other 1930s amendments to the Bankruptcy Act included chapter IX (for the 
reorganization of municipalities) and section 77 of the Railroad Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1935 (for the reorganization of railroads). See generally Chandler 
Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-696, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (incorporating the 1934 
Amendments and comprehensively enacting reorganization and plan provi-
sions for business entities and individuals) (referred to in text as “Chandler 
Act”); Municipal Reorganizations, ch. 657, 50 Stat. 653 (1937); Railroad Reor-
ganization Act of 1935, ch. 774, 49 Stat. 911 (1935); 1934 Amendments to 
Bankruptcy Act, Pub. L. No. 73-486, 48 Stat. 1289 (1934) (enacting corporate 
reorganization provisions, including § 77(B) for plan confirmation). 
286 In re Just for Feet, Inc., 242 B.R. at 825 (Code case) (quoting In re Penn 
Cent. Transp. Co., 467 F.2d at 102 n. 1 (Act case)). 
287 In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 458 F. Supp. 1234, 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1978). 
Of course, the necessity of payment rule has special application to railroad 
insolvency. The purposes of railroad insolvency proceedings under the equity 
receiverships, which gave rise to the necessity of payment rule, went beyond 
paying creditors in accordance with distributional priorities. They included 
the public’s interest in the continuation of the railroad. See, e.g., Miltenberger 
v. Logansport Ry. Co., 106 U.S. 286, 311–12 (1882) (authorizing payment of 
prepetition claims to creditors who threatened not to furnish supplies on 
credit, unless they were paid the arrearages, because otherwise “the business 
of the road would suffer great detriment,” and “the public interest in such a 
highway for public use as a railroad” would suffer). Congressional protection 
of the public’s interest in a railroad’s continued operations is reflected, even 
today, in several provisions of the Code. A railroad is not eligible to be a debtor 
under chapter 7, because under chapter 7 the debtor’s operations cease (unless 
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The Seventh Circuit in Kmart rejected this presumption 
and required a debtor requesting court approval of priority-skipping 
first-day payments to prove ultimate benefit to the disfavored 
creditors.289 Under the Kmart rule, the debtor must show not only 
that the suppliers of goods or services are critical to the debtor’s 
operations and would cease deliveries if they are not paid on account 
of their prepetition claims, but also that “the disfavored creditors 
will be as well off with reorganization as with liquidation.”290 
The Kmart rule arose in a case in which the debtor had 
pushed the doctrine of necessity to, and arguably beyond, its 
limit.291 The bankruptcy court in Kmart had authorized the pay-
ment in full for the prepetition claims of 2,330 of the debtor’s 
“critical” suppliers at a total cost of $300 million.292 Another 2,000 
suppliers were not deemed “critical.”293 They and 43,000 other 
unsecured creditors, who also were not deemed critical, ultimately 
received only 10¢ on the dollar on account of their claims in the 
form of stock in the reorganized Kmart, as compared with the 
full payment afforded to the 2,330 “critical” vendors.294 
The Seventh Circuit held that a bankruptcy court does 
not have the “discretion to set aside the Code’s rules about prior-
ity and distribution” when it determines whether to grant first-
day relief.295 It rejected the doctrine of necessity as “just a fancy 
                                                                                                            
continued by court order, “for a limited time,” pursuant to Code § 721), and 
the debtor’s assets are liquidated. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 109(b) (1), 721 (2012). A 
railroad is eligible to file and reorganize under chapter 11, but the court is 
required by the Code to consider the public interest—in addition to the interests 
of the debtor, its creditors and equity holders—in deciding whether the railroad 
will reorganize or liquidate, and other key matters in the case. See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1165 (2012). In particular, the abandonment of a line and the confirmation of a 
plan must be consistent with the public interest. See 11 U.S.C. § 1170(a)(2) 
(2012); see also 11. U.S.C. § 1173(a)(4) (2012). 
288 See Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 978–79. 
289 In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 873. 
290 Id. 
291 See id. at 868. 
292 Id. at 869. 
293 Id. 
294 Id. 
295 In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 871. The court focused in particular on 
§ 105(a), which “allows a bankruptcy court to ‘issue any order, process, or judg-
ment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of ’ the Code,” 
and held that this section of the Code does not authorize priority-skipping. Id. 
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name for a power to depart from the Code.”296 In the Seventh 
Circuit’s view, the doctrine of necessity was no longer good law 
because it had been supplanted by the provisions of the Code.297 
The Seventh Circuit proceeded to formulate a rule that 
requires the debtor to show the benefit to the disfavored credi-
tors of the reorganization that the first-day payment ostensibly 
would enable.298 The debtor had made no such showing to the 
bankruptcy court, and the Seventh Circuit reversed.299 
Several bankruptcy courts have embraced Kmart.300 Some 
have altered the rule somewhat to require the debtor to show 
that the disfavored creditors eventually will be at least as well 
off as a result of the first-day payments having been made, re-
gardless of whether the debtor reorganizes or is liquidated.301 
Critics of excessive first-day relief express sound concerns.302 
Kmart’s payment of $300 million to 2,300 creditors designated 
“critical” by the debtor is their poster child.303 
                                                                                                            
296 Id. 
297 Id. 
298 See id. at 873. 
299 See id. at 873–74. The court likened its test to the “best interest of cred-
itors” rule, under which any creditor who voted against a chapter 11 plan can 
block confirmation of the plan if it would receive less under the plan than it 
would receive in a chapter 7 liquidation. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A) (2012). 
300 In re Tropical Sportswear Int’l Corp., 320 B.R. at 20 (payment of prepe-
tition amounts to critical vendors can be authorized only if: “(1) those critical 
vendors are indeed critical and have refused to do business with a debtor absent 
payment; and (2) only if the court finds that the disfavored creditors will be 
at least as well off as a result of the court’s granting critical vendor status to 
the select vendors.”); In re Corner Home Care, Inc., 438 B.R. at 127, 129 (cit-
ing Kmart approvingly and applying United American rule); In re Jeans.com, 
Inc., 502 B.R. at 257 (adopting rule of Tropical Sportswear Int’l Corp.); In re 
United Am., 327 B.R. at 781–82, 784 (“If there is to be a Doctrine of Necessity, 
it must be narrowly construed and sparingly applied,” and include a finding 
that “the favorable treatment of the critical vendor must not prejudice other 
unsecured creditors.”). 
301 Id. 
302 Roe & Tung, supra note 251, at 1255; Christopher D. Hunt, Note, Not-
So-Critical Vendors: Redefining Critical Vendor Orders, 93 KY. L.J. 915, 935 
(2004–2005) (“Critical vendor orders should be eliminated. The only place in 
the Bankruptcy Code where their use can be justified is in railroad company 
petitions.”). 
303 In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 869. 
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Critical vendor practice, in the words of some commenta-
tors, has “mushroomed, with critical vendor (and roll-up) orders 
disposing of major portions of estate value.”304 To make matters 
worse, the first-day hearing in a chapter 11 case is held a day or 
two after the case was filed, on minimal notice to creditors and 
other parties in interest, without the possibility of objection from 
an unsecured creditors committee (which has not yet been formed), 
before the first meeting of creditors has been convened, and, gener-
ally, with few parties in the courtroom to advocate for the creditors 
who might be disfavored by the payments.305 
The Jevic Court, swimming a bit against this tide of criti-
cism, went out of its way to provide support for priority-skipping 
first-day relief, albeit in dicta.306 The Court did not resolve the 
circuit split or draw a distinction between the doctrine of neces-
sity and its presumption of the benefit of “preserv[ing] the debtor 
as a going concern,” and the Seventh Circuit’s Kmart rule which 
requires proof that such payments will “make even the disfavored 
creditors better off.”307 While the Seventh Circuit in Kmart laid 
the blame for excessive first-day relief on the doctrine of necessity, 
which in its view harmed disfavored creditors and had no basis 
in the Code,308 the Jevic Court showed no sign that it shared 
this view.309 
Since the Court went as far as it did to provide support for 
first-day relief in chapter 11, it might have gone further in its 
dicta to suggest a resolution of the circuit split.310 But it did not 
and left the issue to the lower courts.311 
What rule, then, should courts follow for first-day relief 
post-Jevic? I argue in the next Section that the doctrine of ne-
cessity’s presumption of benefit compares more favorably than 
its critics acknowledge with the highly speculative hypothetical 
valuation of ultimate distributions that is required by Kmart. 
                                                                                                            
304 Roe & Tung, supra note 251, at 1255; Hunt, supra note 302, at 915, 935. 
305 See also Hunt, supra note 302, at 925, 934–35. 
306 See Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. 973, 985–86 (2017). 
307 Id. 
308 See In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 871. 
309 See Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 984. 
310 Id. 
311 Id. 
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C. Hypothetical Valuations Under the Doctrine of Necessity 
and Kmart 
The necessity of payment doctrine and the Seventh Circuit’s 
Kmart rule differ in one material respect.312 The doctrine of ne-
cessity presumes that the debtor’s continued operation ultimately 
will benefit the disfavored creditors.313 Kmart, by comparison, re-
quires the debtor to show that the disfavored creditors will be at 
least as well off, and the bankruptcy court to find, based on a series 
of hypothetical valuations, that the disfavored creditors ultimately 
will not be harmed by the debtor’s continued operations.314 
As the Court noted in Jevic, it is difficult in nearly all cases 
to make meaningful predictions of final distributional outcomes 
in the first days of a chapter 11 case.315 I suggest below that the 
hypothetical valuations required by Kmart are so speculative that 
the presumption of ultimate creditor benefit under the doctrine 
of necessity is preferable.  
1. Presumed Going Concern Value and Disfavored  
Creditors Under the Doctrine of Necessity 
Is the doctrine of necessity, post-Jevic, up to the task of 
protecting the disfavored creditors against the excesses of first-
day relief? Likely yes. 
The determinations that a court must make with respect 
to requested first-day relief under the doctrine of necessity are 
not that speculative. The court must ask whether the debtor’s 
operations will be severely damaged or imperiled if it cannot obtain 
the critical good, service or credit, and whether the debtor sought 
and failed to obtain an alternative in the market on the same or 
better terms than those proposed to be given to the prepetition 
creditor by the first-day motion.316 The answers to these ques-
tions involve ordinary evidentiary findings of facts that are (or 
are not) in existence at a time that is contemporaneous with the 
                                                                                                            
312 Compare id. at 986, with In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 873.  
313 See Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 986. 
314 See In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 873. 
315 See Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 983. 
316 See In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 873. 
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day of the first-day hearing.317 Whether a critical vendor has a 
contractual obligation to continue to supply postpetition under 
the terms of a contract—and therefore is not legally entitled to 
refuse to perform—is a matter of law that the court can deter-
mine based on the evidence of the contract.318 
Whether a critical vendor or other creditor, who is not 
bound by contract, will continue to supply the debtor with goods, 
services, or credit postpetition if it is not paid the full price that 
it has demanded, gives rise to a game of chicken that bankruptcy 
judges regularly play, often with large and well-represented insti-
tutions insisting on harsh terms.319 Sometimes the court balks at 
entering the order, and the debtor’s counterparty walks away for 
good.320 More often, the debtor and the counterparty renegotiate 
and obtain court approval on new terms that are more favorable 
than those originally proposed by the vendor to the debtor.321 
The doctrine of necessity presumes that disfavored credi-
tors will benefit, or at the very least will not be harmed, by the 
debtor’s preserving its operations.322 Congress also made this pre-
sumption when it enacted the Chandler Act in 1938 and the Bank-
ruptcy Code in 1978.323 The Kmart rule, in contrast, requires the 
                                                                                                            
317 Id. 
318 See id. A party to a contract with a debtor, who refuses to perform post-
bankruptcy unless it is paid on account of a prepetition claim, is in violation 
of the automatic stay because the party seeking payment is exercising control 
over property of the estate (the contract). 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (2012).  
319 See also In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 873–74. 
320 See id. at 873. 
321 The findings required under the doctrine of necessity are, to a significant 
degree, market-based. A supplier of goods and services who has no contract 
with a chapter 11 debtor or other counterparty can charge whatever price it can 
get. That supplier, in most cases, will not have gained the ability to increase 
its price by rent-seeking in the sense of manipulating public policy or economic 
conditions as a strategy for increasing profits any more than a wheat farmer 
does by charging more when wheat is scarce or an airline does when it has 
nearly filled the plane. The bargain sought by the supplier who is not bound by a 
prepetition contract, while distasteful to some and perhaps onerous to others, is 
market-driven. 
322 See also Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 977. 
323 The strength of the presumption of the benefit of the preservation of go-
ing concern value was recognized by Congress when it enacted the Code, and 
is stressed by the Supreme Court in its bankruptcy jurisprudence. Indeed, the 
presumption predates the Code. It was key to the comprehensive enactment 
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debtor to show, and the bankruptcy court to find, that the creditors 
not being paid will be as well off under a hypothetical reorgani-
zation plan confirmed at the end of the case as they would be 
under a hypothetical liquidation of the debtor’s assets.324 But on 
application, the rules are remarkably similar. 
First, the doctrine of necessity addresses the abuses of first-
day relief in nearly every instance without resort to the hypo-
thetical valuation of end-of-case benefit required by Kmart.325 
Indeed, the payments reversed by the Seventh Circuit in Kmart 
would have failed under the doctrine of necessity because the bank-
ruptcy court had made no finding that the vendors proposed to 
be paid were critical to Kmart’s continued operations.326 “All the 
order did was authorize Kmart to pay any vendor that Kmart in 
its discretion deemed ‘critical.’”327 The bankruptcy court also failed 
to find “that any firm would have ceased doing business with Kmart 
if not paid for pre-petition deliveries, and the scant record would 
not have supported such a finding had one been made.”328 In 
addition, many of the allegedly critical vendors—including the 
recipient of the largest critical vendor payment—had long-term 
                                                                                                            
of the reorganization provisions of the Chandler Act that preceded the Code. See, 
e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 6179 (1977). Regarding the 1978 Bankruptcy Code: 
The purpose of a business reorganization case, unlike a liqui-
dation case, is to restructure a business’s finances so that it may 
continue to operate, provide its employees with jobs, pay its cred-
itors, and produce a return for its stockholders. The premise 
of a business reorganization is that assets that are used for 
production in the industry for which they were designed are 
more valuable than those same assets sold for scrap … It is more 
economically efficient to reorganize than to liquidate, because 
it preserves jobs and assets. 
Knoeller, supra note 43, at 14 (for business enterprises, the reorganization 
provisions of the Chandler Act “embodie[d] the new social economic concept of 
reorganization and the rehabilitation of the debtor and his business as a 
going concern, instead of the liquidation, distribution, and stoppage of busi-
ness with the consequent loss to the debtor, creditors, employees, and the 
public generally.”).  
324 See In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 872. 
325 See id. at 870–71, 874 (discussing hypothetical scenarios involving 
preference-recovery actions and reorganization). 
326 See id. at 874. 
327 Id. at 870. 
328 Id. at 874. 
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contracts with the debtor.329 Such vendors were legally required 
to continue to supply the debtor under the contract postpetition, 
and “the automatic stay prevent[ed] these vendors from walking 
away as long as the debtor pa[id] [them] for new deliveries.”330 
The critical vendor motion in Kmart, simply, failed under the 
doctrine of necessity. 
Second, the rules are similar because each considers whether 
similarly situated creditors who do not receive a first-day distri-
bution will benefit, nonetheless, by the preservation of the debt-
or’s operations and going concern value.331 The difference is that 
the doctrine of necessity presumes such benefit.332 Kmart by 
comparison requires a bankruptcy court to make several highly 
speculative findings and hypothetical valuations at the first-day 
hearing, to determine whether such benefit exists.333 The uncer-
tainty and logistical difficulties in reaching these findings and 
                                                                                                            
329 See id. at 873. 
330 See id. The Supreme Court also responded by issuing Bankruptcy Rule 
6003 in 2007 to provide some further check on the excesses that the Seventh 
Circuit criticized in 2004. That Rule provides that, “[e]xcept to the extent that 
relief is necessary to avoid immediate and irreparable harm,” a bankruptcy 
court cannot, within twenty-one days after the filing of the petition, issue an 
order authorizing the use of estate property to pay “all or any part of a claim 
that arose before the filing of the petition.” FED. R. BANKR. P. 6003(b). See FED. 
R. BANKR. P. 6003 Notes, archived at Cornell Law School, https://www.law 
.cornell.edu/rules/frbp/rule_6003 [https://perma.cc/EHG9-HQKS]; FED. R. 
BANKR. P. 6003 Committee Notes on Rules—2007, archived at Cornell Law 
School, https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frbp/rule_6003 [https://perma.cc/EH 
G9 -HQKS]. 
331 See generally FED. R. BANKR. P. 6003 (describing case-applications for 
employment motions); In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 866. 
332 Russell A. Eisenberg & Frances F. Gecker, The Doctrine of Necessity 
and Its Parameters, 73 MARQ. L. REV. at 4 (1989) (the doctrine of necessity is 
“premised on the bankruptcy goal of maintaining the prospects for a viable 
reorganization during the early stages of a case” and “embod[ies] the fact that 
there are some prepetition creditors who must be paid immediately because if 
they are not paid, everyone else will suffer.”). 
333 Compare In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 467 F.2d at 102 n. 1 (Act case) 
(the necessity of payment doctrine “permit[s] immediate payment of claims of 
creditors where those creditors will not supply services or material essential 
to the conduct of the business until their pre-reorganization claims shall have 
been paid.”), with In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 873 (requiring a debtor show 
“that the disfavored creditors will be as well off with reorganization as with 
liquidation—a demonstration never attempted in this proceeding”). 
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valuations are considered below and, in the end, are not that dif-
ferent from the presumption of benefit that is made under the 
doctrine of necessity.334 
2. Hypothetical Valuations and the Kmart Rule 
Commentators and some courts lauded Kmart for reigning 
in excessive first-day priority-skipping relief, and perhaps with 
good reason on the facts of that case.335 But is the Kmart rule an 
effective solution to such excesses? Likely not. 
Hypothetical, judicial valuations inherently fall far short of 
determining actual, market values.336 The hypothetical valuations 
required by Kmart are wildly speculative at best.337 
The Seventh Circuit in Kmart required a debtor to demon-
strate, and a bankruptcy court to find, that the disfavored credi-
tors will be as well off with the reorganization that was enabled 
by the first-day payments as with liquidation that will result if 
the first-day payments are not authorized and the debtor’s oper-
ations cease.338 The court did not consider how this valuation was 
to be obtained, it stated simply that the debtor never attempted 
such a demonstration in the bankruptcy court.339 I consider, in 
the following paragraphs, the hypothetical valuation that must 
be made to satisfy this requirement, and conclude that it is of 
inconsequential probative value. 
                                                                                                            
334 In some rare cases, a chapter 11 debtor’s prospects may be so dim from 
the outset that preserving its operations will harm creditors. Chapter 11’s 
presumption that the debtor’s continuing to operate ultimately will benefit all 
creditors is rebuttable in such cases, under § 1112, which recognizes that the 
bankruptcy court may dismiss that debtor’s chapter 11 case or convert it to a 
chapter 7 liquidation. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (2012). A rebuttable presumption of 
the benefit of continuing operations for the purpose of first-day relief is, I urge, 
more in line with Congress’s findings and purposes when it enacted the chapter 
11 provisions of the Code. Shifting the burden of proof to the debtor on this issue 
at the first-day hearing in the case is not. 
335 Roe & Tung, supra note 251, at 1257. 
336 See Douglas G. Baird & Donald S. Bernstein, Absolute Priority, Valuation 
Uncertainty, and the Reorganization Bargain, 115 YALE L.J. 1930, 1941–42 (2006) 
(detailing the difficulties involved in valuing a business). 
337 Id. 
338 In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 872–73. 
339 Id. at 873. 
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The bankruptcy judge actually must make two different 
hypothetical valuations under Kmart, each of which requires a 
number of guesses and assumptions: for the first valuation, the 
judge must assume that the first-day payments are not made, and 
then determine the amount of distributions to creditors if the 
debtor’s assets were liquidated at the beginning of the case;340 
for the second valuation, the judge must assume that the first-day 
payments are made, and then must project the ultimate resulting 
estate value and creditor distributions under a hypothetical reor-
ganization plan—that the bankruptcy court predicts it could con-
firm as of an indefinite time that is months or years in the future.341 
The first valuation is the simpler one. The bankruptcy judge, 
to satisfy the Kmart rule, must determine the present value of 
the debtor’s assets and business on a liquidation, without any expo-
sure of those assets to the market.342 She then must quantify the 
claims against those assets, by amount and priority—in most cases 
before the debtor’s schedules listing those claims have been filed, 
before the debtor has been examined on those schedules at the first 
meeting of creditors, before most creditors have filed proofs of 
claims, and before the claims allowance process by which claims are 
allowed or disallowed has even commenced.343 These uncertainties 
                                                                                                            
340 See infra Section III.C. 
341 Id. 
342 See generally In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 868. 
343 The bankruptcy judge at a first-day hearing has very little evidence on 
which to base a determination of the ultimate distributional outcomes in a chapter 
11 case. Almost all of the information needed to make this determination comes 
later. A chapter 11 debtor, for example, is not required to file the schedules or 
other information regarding its assets and liabilities until 14 days of the filing of a 
voluntary case. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a) (2012); FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(b). That deadline 
can be extended by the court, for cause shown. FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(c). And 
those schedules are just the debtor’s side of its financial story. The United States 
trustee does not examine the debtor with respect to that financial information 
until the meeting of creditors that it convenes, within “a reasonable time” after 
the filing of the voluntary petition, on not less than twenty-one days’ notice to all 
creditors who at the meeting also may question the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 341(a) 
(2012); FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(a)(1). Creditors also are entitled to file claims 
against the debtor, which often are in addition to or different from the claims 
listed by the debtor in its schedules. The deadline for filing those proofs claim in 
a chapter 11 case, i.e., the “bar date,” comes later, and is fixed by the court, 
typically on the filing of the debtor’s motion on twenty-one days’ notice to creditors. 
FED. R. BANKR. P 3003(c). Creditors then are entitled to another twenty-one days’ 
notice of the bar date, so that they have due time to prepare and file their claims. 
FED. R. BANKR. P 2002(a)(7). The debtor then can object to the proofs of claim. 
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in nearly all but a pre-packaged chapter 11 case will overwhelm 
the probative worth of the valuation. 
The harder part for the judge comes next, though. She 
must hypothetically value the debtor’s business on a going con-
cern basis—as of the indeterminate time, months or years in the 
future, at which she predicts that the debtor’s reorganization plan 
will be confirmed.344 And she must then, somehow, also determine 
the distributions that will be made to creditors under that sup-
positional plan that has not yet been filed and the terms of which 
have not yet been proposed to or negotiated with the debtor’s 
creditors, owners and other parties in interest.345 
In the end, all methods for hypothetically valuing a busi-
ness “are merely estimates of the present value of the business’s 
future earning capacity.”346 The value of a non-fungible asset 
such as a business cannot be determined with any precision un-
less it is properly marketed to potential buyers and then is sold 
to the highest bidder for the asset.347 This second valuation re-
quired by Kmart involves no exposure to the market; it begins 
with guesswork at best, of a projected future value of the firm.348 
And the difficulties with this second, future hypothetical val-
uation do not end there. Chapter 11 plans are not predetermined 
or formulaic.349 A debtor can propose a plan350 or, after expiration 
of the exclusive period within which only the debtor may propose a 
plan, any creditor or other party in interest can propose one, includ-
ing a chapter 11 trustee if one has been appointed.351 The propo-
nent of the plan determines the classes of creditors and holders 
                                                                                                            
FED. R. BANKR. P 3007. The court ultimately either allows the claim, in whole or 
in part, or disallows it. The process described above occurs over a period of months 
or years after the first-day hearing in a typical chapter 11 case. Determining 
the aggregate claims against the estate early in the case is further complicated 
because many claims are unliquidated (such as unresolved contract and tort 
claims) at the that time, and many claims have not yet arisen (such as dam-
age claims arising from the rejection of executory contracts and leases). 
344 In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 873 (“it is necessary to show… that the dis-
favored creditors will be as well off with reorganization as with liquidation”). 
345 Id. 
346 Baird & Bernstein, supra note 336, at 1941–42. 
347 Id. 
348 See generally In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 868. 
349 See 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (2012). 
350 Id. 
351 §§ 1122–23. 
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of equity interests, and the treatment of the claims interests 
within each of those classes, within the Code’s somewhat flexible 
parameters.352 Confirmation of a consensual plan which all vot-
ing classes have voted to accept has fewer requirements than 
does a cramdown plan (which at least one voting class has voted 
for, but which one or more classes have voted against).353 But the 
plan’s terms bind dissenting creditors within a class that votes 
for a plan that the bankruptcy court confirms regardless.354 As a 
result of these factors and others, the distributions to creditors 
and equity on account of their claims and interests under a plan 
are the result of negotiations that can take months or even years 
to conclude, punctuated in a complex case by periodic litigation over 
issues that have a material bearing on the terms of the plan.355 
For all of these reasons, the ultimate terms of a reorganization 
plan in a typical chapter 11 case are shrouded, at the beginning 
of a case, in a haze of uncertainty.356  
The Kmart valuation also requires the bankruptcy judge to 
speculate on when the plan providing for the distributions to credi-
tors will be confirmed.357 This finding by the judge is based on 
mere conjecture, unless the debtor negotiated a “pre-packaged” 
plan with its creditors prior to filing the case.358 
As a result of these assumptions that the bankruptcy 
judge must make, which in most cases are nearly arbitrary, the 
quality of the hypothetical valuations under Kmart will be very 
weak. The finest crystal ball will give the judge little guidance. 
Moreover, if the judge has determined that not paying the alleg-
edly critical creditors will cause immediate and irreparable harm by 
threatening the debtor’s operations and existence, then she will 
need to make all of these valuations at a first-day hearing, without 
                                                                                                            
352 Id. 
353 § 1129(b)(1). 
354 § 1126(c)(d). 
355 See supra notes 363–71 and accompanying text. 
356 See id. 
357 See infra Section III.C.2. 
358 Id. Under a typical prepackaged plan in current chapter 11 practice, 
the secured debt is consensually restructured, unsecured debt “rides through,” 
i.e., is paid in full in the ordinary course of the debtor’s business operations, and 
the equity in the reorganized company is issued to the secured debtholders who 
agreed to the restructuring. Because the unsecured creditors are not impaired, 
the absolute priority rule is satisfied with respect to them. 
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the extensive advocacy and evidentiary record that informs most 
complex judicial decisions.359 
The Seventh Circuit in Kmart recognized that a judge, to 
confirm a chapter 11 plan, must conduct a similar comparison of 
distributions on liquidation as opposed to distributions under the 
plan.360 That comparison, called the “best interest of creditors” 
test, requires the judge to find that any creditor who voted against 
the chapter 11 plan will receive a distribution under the plan that is 
not less than the amount that it would receive if the debtor were 
liquidated under chapter 7.361 
But the “best interest of creditors” determination for plan 
confirmation under the Code is made by the judge after the terms 
of the plan have been negotiated, reduced to writing, filed, submit-
ted to, and analyzed by the judge and by the debtor’s creditors 
and other parties in interest.362 The filings made in connection 
with the plan must include a liquidation analysis prepared by 
the plan proponent’s accountants or financial advisors, against 
which the judge can compare the distributions to creditors and 
equity on a hypothetical chapter 7 liquidation against the distri-
butions to creditors and equity provided for in the plan.363 Credi-
tors and other parties in interest may object and be heard on the 
issue of whether the “best interest of creditors” requirement has 
been met.364 The judge has the advantage of considering all of 
this information and these objections in a contested proceeding 
prior to reaching her decision.365 Further, the two outcomes that 
the judge must compare in applying the “best interest of credi-
tors” test at confirmation are for the most part contemporaneous, 
requiring near-term predictions on liquidation prices compared 
to the distributions to creditors that are set forth in detail in the 
chapter 11 plan.366 
                                                                                                            
359 FED. R. BANKR. PROC. 6003(b). 
360 In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 872–73. 
361 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A) (2012). The Seventh Circuit likened the second 
prong of its rule to this requirement for plan confirmation. 
362 See § 1123 (delineating the contents a plan must have for presentment 
to the judge). 
363 § 1129(a)(7)(A). 
364 FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(b). 
365 Id. 
366 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A) (2012). 
2018] ABSOLUTE PRIORITY REDUX 129 
The bankruptcy judge, in sum, has a far smaller task in 
determining, at plan confirmation, whether the “best interest of 
creditors” requirement has been satisfied than he has under the 
Kmart rule.367 The point in time for comparison (plan confirma-
tion) and the terms of the plan are no longer speculative, and a far 
greater advocacy over a lengthy period of time is associated with 
the court’s decision.368 Courts and commentators recognize none-
theless that the hypothetical liquidation-to-reorganization compari-
son that must be made to satisfy the “best interest of creditors” 
requirement at the chapter 11 plan confirmation hearing “is not 
an exact science and must in part be based on reasonable as-
sumptions and ‘best guesses.’”369 The proof required by Kmart by 
comparison will in most cases be based on arbitrary assump-
tions and wild guesses.370 
The Seventh Circuit’s reversal in Kmart turned on the 
debtor’s failure to offer any evidence that the creditors who were 
not paid on the first-day would be as well off under a hypothet-
ical reorganization plan as they would be under a hypothetical 
liquidation of the debtor’s assets.371 One can view Kmart as do-
ing nothing more than shifting a burden of proof.372 The court 
declined to presume, as a court may under the doctrine of neces-
sity, that a priority-skipping first-day payment that preserves the 
debtor’s operations and going concern value is sufficiently likely 
to benefit even the disadvantaged creditors.373 Instead, under 
Kmart, the debtor must prove it.374 
Given how hypothetical any such proof of ultimate distri-
butional outcomes will be at the first-day hearing in a chapter 
11 case, it is hardly surprising that neither Kmart nor any case 
which has purported to follow it has turned on the quality of such 
proof.375 Rather, the Seventh Circuit and such other courts have 
                                                                                                            
367 CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 1138 (2d ed. 2009) (citing 
In re Crowthers McCall Pattern, Inc., 120 B.R. 279 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990)). 
368 See supra notes 379–84 and accompanying text. 
369 Id.  
370 See id. 
371 In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 873. 
372 Id. at 865. 
373 Id.  
374 Id.  
375 Id. at 868; see infra note 393 and accompanying text. 
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based their decisions on: (1) whether the debtor proved that it could 
not find a market alternative (the inquiry at the heart of the doc-
trine of necessity); and/or (2) whether the debtor had offered any 
evidence regarding ultimate distributional outcomes for skipped-
over creditors in a hypothetical reorganization as compared with 
a hypothetical liquidation test.376 
                                                                                                            
376 See id. at 873 (debtor “never attempted” to show either that the critical 
vendors would have ceased deliveries absent the payment or that the disfavored 
creditors would be as well off with reorganization as with liquidation); In re 
Tropical Sportswear Int’l Corp., 320 B.R. at 17, 19–21 (purportedly following 
Kmart, yet presuming, as does the doctrine of necessity, that if the debtor is 
“unable to continue in business without the continued supply” of the critical 
products, then, “[i]n such cases, even the disfavored creditors are better off by 
paying the critical vendors since the payments enable a successful reorganiza-
tion;” the court also speculated that the disadvantaged creditors would benefit 
because the critical vendors were being paid only a percentage of their claims 
and were waiving the balance other than their “valid reclamation claims” which 
would be paid in full, so that “the exact discount” to the debtors was “yet to be 
determined”); In re Jeans.com, Inc., 502 B.R. at 257, 259 (following Tropical 
Sportswear, yet presuming that “the disfavored creditors [were] better off by 
paying the critical vendors since the payments enable[d] a successful reor-
ganization ....” There was no evidence regarding the predicted distributions to 
skipped-over creditors on a hypothetical reorganization.). The court in United 
American considered a critical vendor motion, filed six weeks after the chapter 
11 case was commenced, in which the debtor asserted that two vendors were 
“essential for the debtor’s continued operation and successful reorganization,” 
and that the court should authorize payment of the vendors’ prepetition claims 
under the doctrine of necessity. After an evidentiary hearing, the court denied 
the motion as to one vendor and granted it as to the other, “not on the basis of 
the Doctrine of Necessity, but as an assumption of an executory contract.” The 
court nonetheless cited Kmart for the proposition that the doctrine of necessity 
was easily abused and “[i]f there is to be a Doctrine of Necessity, it must be 
narrowly construed and sparingly applied.” Regarding the vendors at issue, the 
court found that the question of prejudice to creditors was resolved by the deter-
mination of whether the goods or services were essential, and whether the price 
paid by the debtor was too high. In re United Am., 327 B.R. at 783–84. And in 
In re Corner Home Care, Inc., while the court cited Kmart and United Ameri-
can favorably for the proposition that “the favorable treatment of the critical 
vendor must not prejudice other unsecured creditors,” it denied the motion 
because the debtor failed to show that there was no alternative supplier of the 
goods, or that the asserted critical supplier would not supply the goods unless 
it received payment of its prepetition claim. In re Corner Home Care, Inc., 438 
B.R. at 128. The bankruptcy court in In re Pioneer Health Services, Inc., decided 
post-Jevic, similarly denied the debtor’s motion to make critical vendor pay-
ments to physicians because there was no evidence that the physicians were 
irreplaceable, or could or would stop working if they were not paid. It did not 
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There will be some extraordinary cases in which the bank-
ruptcy court’s first-day predictions required by Kmart of the ul-
timate net benefit to creditors are plausible notwithstanding these 
difficulties. This might be the case if the first-day payments of 
prepetition claims to critical creditors are so high, and the prospects 
for meaningful returns to the disfavored creditors that might result 
from the debtor’s continuing to operate and reorganize are so low, 
that a prompt liquidation of the debtor’s assets is preferable. This 
might be the case where the debtor is “dead on arrival,” and there 
simply is no reasonable prospect of a reorganization. It also might 
be the case with respect to a prepackaged plan. But in nearly all 
other cases, the opposite will hold. The variables will be so nu-
merous, the assumptions will be so arbitrary, and the ultimate 
outcomes will be so uncertain, that the hypothetical valuations 
required by Kmart will be nearly if not entirely meaningless.377 
D. First-Day Relief After Jevic 
The Jevic Court did not resolve the circuit split between 
the doctrine of necessity and the Kmart rule.378 But, though ar-
guably dictum, the Court’s message was clear: “One can generally 
find significant Code-related objectives” for first-day relief “that 
the priority-violating distributions serve,” whether preserving the 
debtor as a going concern, as required by the doctrine of necessity, 
or making “even the disfavored creditors better off,” as required 
by Kmart.379 The Court left it at that, declining to embrace the 
hypothetical valuations required by Kmart.380 
The inadequacy of such hypothetical valuations and the 
efficacy of market exposure to address the problems of control 
premiums and collusion is an analytic theme of the Court’s last 
two absolute priority rule cases—in Jevic when it second-guessed 
the bankruptcy court’s determination, made without market expo-
sure, that the settled claim had little value, and in 203 N. LaSalle 
                                                                                                            
consider the likelihood of eventual benefit or detriment to the other creditors 
who were not receiving the first-day payments. In re Pioneer Health Services, 
Inc., 570 B.R. 228, 235–36 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2017). 
377 Baird & Bernstein, supra note 336, at 1941–42. 
378 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 987–88 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
379 Id. at 985 (citing In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 872). 
380 See generally id. at 973. 
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when it reversed because the equity in the new debtor had not 
been marketed.381 The Court accepted as a given the difficulty of 
applying the rule of priorities to first-day relief or other interim 
transactions in a chapter 11 case, because the nature and extent 
of the estate and the claims against it are not yet fully resolved 
and thus, I suggest, can be valued only hypothetically.382 
Jevic did not discard the doctrine of necessity as a relic of 
pre-Code law, nor did it disparage Kmart.383 Jevic does suggest, 
though, that a bankruptcy court’s finding that first-day relief will 
“make even the disfavored creditors better off” does not require 
hypothetical future valuations of a chapter 11 debtor’s business 
or assets, or projections of the ultimate distributions to creditors.384 
More likely, chapter 11’s presumption that continued operations 
and preservation of going concern value will benefit all creditors 
should suffice.385 
This approach addresses the excessive first-day relief of 
which some critics, rightfully, complain.386 It does this by requir-
ing evidentiary proof that the relief is essential to the debtor’s 
operations, and that the debtor sought and could not obtain an al-
ternative on better terms, in the market.387 This proof will consist, 
in most cases, of credible testimony that the critical vendor has 
refused to provide a good, service or credit essential its opera-
tions unless it is paid on account of its prepetition claims, and that 
the debtor diligently contacted alternative suppliers, none of 
whom would provide the good, service or credit on better terms 
than those demanded by the critical vendor.388  
It dispenses, though, with the wildly speculative hypothetical 
predictions of future value and distributions, based on facts largely 
                                                                                                            
381 Id. at 983; 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 466–69. 
382 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 985. 
383 Id. at 985, 986. 
384 Id. at 985 (quoting In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 872). 
385 Id. at 977. 
386 See Roe & Tung, supra note 251. 
387 This evidentiary requirement is not very different from the evidentiary 
requirement for approval of postpetition borrowing under Code section 364. 
Under that section, for example, a debtor in possession cannot obtain approval of 
a loan secured by a lien in its assets unless it proves that it could not obtain 
the loan on an unsecured basis. 11 U.S.C. § 364(c) (2012). 
388 Id. 
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undeveloped at a first-day hearing, that the Seventh Circuit re-
quired.389 It replaces these hypothetical valuations with the Con-
gressional presumption of going concern value that, for nearly a 
century, has been at the core of reorganization law in the U.S.390 
IV. VALUATION UNCERTAINTY, LEGAL CERTAINTY, AND THE 
ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE  
“The result is uncertainty,” the Jevic Court emphasized 
when it declined to create a “rare case” exception to the absolute 
priority rule for case-ending settlements in chapter 11.391 This 
uncertainty, the Court continued, alters the parties’ leverage and 
makes settlements more difficult to achieve.392 
Market exposure can in many cases provide that certainty, 
which hypothetical predictions and valuations cannot, with respect 
to both first-day relief and interim and other pre-plan settlements 
and transactions in chapter 11.393 Such market certainty ena-
bles a court to determine to a greater legal certainty the value of 
the good, service, or credit being offered by an allegedly critical 
vendor in exchange for a proposed first-day distribution, the value 
of a claim or other estate asset that is the subject of such settlement 
or transaction, and whether a control premium is being paid from 
estate assets. 
                                                                                                            
389 In re Kmart Corp., 369 F.3d at 872–73. 
390 Knoeller, supra note 43, at 14; H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 120 (1977). 
391 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 986. 
392 Id. at 987 (citing RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 
566 U.S. 639, 649 (2012); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Prece-
dent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J. LAW & ECON. 249, 271 (1976)). 
393 The transition from hypothetical to market valuations of a debtor’s busi-
ness already has occurred to a great extent in U.S. bankruptcy law and practice 
with the rise and development of the court-approved going concern sale under 
Code section 363(b). The business in larger chapter 11 cases most often is 
valued, not by plan negotiations over hypothetical values, but by court-approved 
auction procedures. The business, once sold, has new owners, new secured 
financing (often enabling both the business’ acquisition by the new owners 
and its post-sale operations), and new unsecured creditors with respect to goods 
and services obtained by the business on credit post-sale. Because it is no longer in 
the debtor’s estate, bankruptcy court supervision ends, and the reorganization 
and restructuring of the business is done. The fund arising from the acquirer’s 
paying the purchase price is then distributed to creditors of the debtor’s estate, 
either pursuant to a liquidating plan, or if a plan cannot be confirmed, by a trustee 
following conversion to chapter 7.  
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This certainty is obtained, for requested first-day relief, 
by requiring a debtor to seek a market alternative for the good, 
service or credit at issue, coupled with a rebuttable presumption 
that creditors will benefit if the debtor’s business is preserved as 
a going concern. This certainty is lost if first-day decisions are 
based on hypothetical projections of the distributions that will be 
made to creditors under an imaginary plan postulated to be con-
firmed months or perhaps years later. 
Certainty also is obtained for a proposed interim or pre-plan 
settlement or other transaction once it is exposed to the market. 
The value of estate property becomes certain, as the Court recog-
nized in both Jevic and 203 N. LaSalle, when the assets are exposed 
to the market.394 A properly marketed sale ends the uncertainty 
about what something is worth. The battle of experts in a hypo-
thetical valuation proceeding does not. Determining value by expos-
ing a settlement or other transaction with an insider or other 
controlling entity to competing bids also enables a court to de-
termine whether a control premium is being paid in violation of 
a fundamental policy behind the absolute priority rule. 
This ultimate certainty also is likely to encourage negoti-
ations, over the terms of first-day relief, and over an interim or 
other pre-plan settlement or other disposition of a claim or asset, 
and the distribution of estate property among parties who have 
different priority positions. Parties in chapter 11 often bargain 
in the midst of valuation uncertainty, knowing that the values at 
issue must at some time become certain. A party can be expected to 
bargain more efficiently—cognizant of its weaknesses as well as 
its strengths—if it knows that marketing is imminent or ongoing, 
and that this market exposure will preclude with certainty both 
a below-market sale and the payment of a control premium. 
CONCLUSION 
The Jevic Court mapped the sea from the dry land to a 
great extent. The firm ground is clearly defined—at the end of a 
chapter 11 case, strict compliance with distributional priorities 
generally is required for non-consensual distributions made out-
side of a plan (such as pursuant to a structured dismissal).395 
                                                                                                            
394 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 978–79; 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 455. 
395 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 986. 
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The Court, though, left mostly uncharted the vast sea in 
which one finds transactions that are not case-ending, such as 
interim and other pre-plan settlements and transactions, first-
day orders, and the distributions made under them.396 The Court 
plotted, instead, a wide course around two shoals created by circuit 
splits on the issue of distributions that are not case-ending, leav-
ing them mostly unmarked.397 
The first circuit split that the Court did not resolve was 
whether there is a per se rule that requires absolute distribu-
tional priority for interim and other pre-plan settlements and 
transactions in chapter 11. The Court on this issue emphasized 
the difficulty of hypothetically assessing such a settlement or other 
transaction that is not case-ending, because the “extent of the 
Estate and the claims against it are not yet fully resolved.”398 Still, 
it suggested, bankruptcy courts approving even these settlements 
and transactions must show a proper solicitude—or at least not 
show an outright disregard—for the absolute priority rule.399 
The other unresolved split was the ground for approving 
first-day distributions in chapter 11 that may be priority-skipping. 
The doctrine of necessity presumes the benefit of preserving the 
debtor’s operations, while the Seventh Circuit’s Kmart decision 
requires a bankruptcy court to make a finding that such payments 
ultimately will benefit (or at least will not harm) the remaining 
creditors who do not receive a first-day payment.400 The Court 
on this issue indicated that priority-skipping first-day relief and 
distributions often serve some significant Code-related purpose, 
such as preserving the debtor’s operations in order to maximize 
value and enable a reorganization.401 It said nothing, though, of 
whether a bankruptcy court can presume, or instead must re-
quire proof of, such benefit. 
The Court in both Jevic and 203 N. LaSalle more firmly 
expressed unease with transactions approved on a record devoid of 
evidence of market exposure and based instead on a hypothetical 
                                                                                                            
396 See id. at 973. 
397 Id. at 987–88 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
398 Id. at 985. 
399 Id. at 986. 
400 Id. at 985. 
401 Id. 
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valuation.402 A bankruptcy court assessing a transaction hypo-
thetically, without market exposure, cannot determine with a 
reasonable degree of certainty whether the value of the estate is 
being misallocated to parties who exercise control over a debtor 
and to those who colluded with them.403 
The course toward the rules for approval of pre-plan set-
tlements and transactions and first-day distributions becomes more 
certain, I suggest, with these markers left by the Court in Jevic 
and 203 N. LaSalle kept in view. 
Exposing to market scrutiny the estate claims and other 
assets proposed to be released or transferred pursuant to a trans-
action challenged as benefiting an insider or other party exercis-
ing control can throw into strong relief whether a control premium 
is being paid at the expense of the estate and the parties who 
are not in on the deal, and can thus cast light on the shadows in 
which collusion may have occurred.404 This sale process in most 
cases will provide reliable evidence that no part of the estate is go-
ing to those exercising control or those who colluded with them, 
and will result, in many cases, in a higher and better bid for the 
claim or other asset at issue.405 
This approach, especially with respect to first-day relief, 
also entails acknowledging both that market exposure is not always 
possible, and the extent to which the hypothetical valuations that 
might be used in its stead are unreliable.406 This recognition does 
not leave the question of first-day relief at sea. Rather, a bank-
ruptcy court can determine whether a chapter 11 debtor sought 
and failed to obtain a market alternative to what is being pro-
vided by the party who would receive the priority-skipping dis-
tribution under the requested first-day order.407 The issue of 
whether the parties not receiving such first-day distributions will 
benefit is best addressed, I suggest, not by the highly speculative 
determination of the ultimate distributions that the bankruptcy 
court hypothesizes will be made at the end of the case, but by a 
                                                                                                            
402 See Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 978–79; 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 455–57. 
403 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 985; 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 436, 457–58. 
404 Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 985. 
405 Baird & Bernstein, supra note 336, at 1943. 
406 Id. at 1941–42. 
407 See In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d at 872–74; In re Corner Home Care, Inc., 
438 B.R. at 127. 
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rebuttable presumption that preserving a chapter 11 debtor’s 
operations in order to maximize value and enable a reorganiza-
tion ultimately will benefit those creditors more than if the first-
day payments had not been made and the debtor’s operations 
had ceased. 
Distributional priorities and the problem of control pre-
miums that deviate from them have been at the epicenter of U.S. 
bankruptcy law for 150 years.408 Still, the extent to which the 
absolute priority rule applies to interim and pre-plan settlements 
and transactions and to first-day relief is not mapped by the Code. 
It has been sketched but lightly by the Jevic Court.409 I suggest 
that the approaches outlined in this Paper can address in many 
cases the issues that the absolute priority rule was created to 
remedy. Market exposure of the claims and other assets that are 
the subject of such interim settlements and transactions can pre-
clude to a great extent misallocations of estate value to those in 
control. Market exposure of the good, service or credit proposed to 
be provided by an asserted critical provider pursuant to first-day 
relief can preclude misallocations of estate value to providers 
who are not critical. Maximizing the use of these approaches, and 
reducing speculative, hypothetical determinations of asset val-
ues and creditor distributions, also can provide the certainty sought 
by the Jevic Court in this area of U.S. bankruptcy law. 
 
                                                                                                            
408 R.R. Co. v. Howard, 74 U.S. 392, 410 (1868). 
409 11 U.S.C. §§ 1122, 1123(a)(4) (2012); Czyzewski, 137 S. Ct. at 985–88. 
 
 
 
